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The Society and the Observation and Surveillance Technologies

Results of the On Line Survey and of the Focus Groups

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CITA – UNIVERSITY OF NAMUR

Sept 2009

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Part 1. On Line Survey : Looking For the Experts and Activists' Opinions

Introduction to the On Line Survey : a Quantitative Method

This first part of the chapter is divided on 6 sections. The first section is a description of the population of respondents whose have answered our questionnaire. The second section is an analysis our respondents' valuesystems as they are revealed through their answers to the questionnaire. The third section is an analysis of our respondents' answers to our generic questions concerning OST (observation and surveillance technologies). In the fourth section we comment on our respondents' views on the MIAUCE scenarios that are at the core of this project. In section five, we comment on our respondents' answers to our questions regarding the conditions of social acceptability of OST and video-surveillance systems. The the last section regards the regulation of the OST and video-surveillance systems considering the assessment made by the respondents on the existing regulation and their recommendation for its improvement.

On a more practical note, as it has been commented above, it is important to remind the reader that the questionnaire that has served for the collect of our respondents' opinions has been voluntarily orientated towards the extraction of opinions allowing for the verifying of working hypotheses our other enquiries on OST and video-surveillance systems have suggested as analytically and/or ethically important. This explains that a large majority of the questions are close, based on predefinite items that respondents have to assess. As such, the *very wording of the questions* submitted to our respondents is an important feature of this report. We thus invite the reader to refer to the questionnaire itself, added as an appendix to this document. This report will also make specific mention some of these questions critical for the reading of results in the text itself.

The comments of the results remain very descriptive. This is due to the size of the samples (see section 1) which appears too small to make more analytical statistics.

1. The Respondents

Two main populations have been studied through this on-line questionnaire. The first one is constituted of what we will qualify as ‘experts’ – this use of the term is explained in the coming paragraph – in observation and surveillance technologies, ‘OST’ in our text. These are mentioned as ‘expert respondents’ in our later text. The second group is constituted of militants and activists striving for the protection of fundamental rights and liberties. These are mentioned as ‘activists’ or the ‘activist respondents’ in the text.

1.1. The Rational Population : the Experts

The first population targeted by this questionnaire is that ‘experts’ in information and communication technologies (ICT) and OST. By ‘experts’, we mean individuals whose position and/or professional activity leads to their development of informed opinions about OST. So as to constitute our sample, we have constituted a list of 500 e-mail addresses of:

- Scientists and engineers participating to national, European R&D projects or belonging to COST networks related to OST;
- Individuals – researchers and functionaries – working for Technology Assessment organisms and institutions. These were identified among others through the website of the European Parliamentary Technology Assessment. The address of this site is as follows: <http://www.eptanetwork.org>. In this group, we have more specifically targeted individuals dealing with ICTs;
- Individuals – researchers and functionaries – working for associations and organisms for the protection of privacy and/or the defence of fundamental rights and liberties.


So as to maximise the number of respondents, the questionnaire has been communicated twice to the mailing list so compiled. Each time, we left out the questionnaire for about two weeks. Out of the whole of the contacted population, we have received 106 usable questionnaires, that is, about a 20% answering ratio, which is considered normal for the collect of data through on-line questionnaires.

Our population of respondents consists of 43 women and 63 men.

Most expert respondents are aged between 31 and 50 (51%). 23% of the other respondents are below 30 and 26% over 50. This leads to 77% of our expert respondents being 31 years old or more, which is quite coherent for a population of expert.

Among our expert respondents, 41% have a background in the social sciences, 37% in engineering and the hard and physical sciences, 18% have a Law-related profile, and 4% come from more diverse backgrounds.

The ventilation of nationalities is as follows: 32% Belgian nationals, 29% French nationals, 8% Spanish nationals, 5% British nationals. The remaining 27% mostly originate from European countries and North America.



We have called this population the ‘rational’ as the opinions they have expressed are informed by their research and professional activities. Also we have used this term to contrast this more ‘analysing’ population against that of the more engaged active militants criticising and striving against OST due to concerns for the respect of fundamental rights and liberties.

1.2. The Passionate Population: the Activists

Our second population is thus constituted of engaged militants criticising and striving against OST due to concerns and worries for the respect of fundamental rights and liberties. We qualify this population as ‘passionate’ due to that its opinions are motivated by a strong, sometimes radical as it will be clear in the analysis below, bent against OST due to the threats it implies for fundamental rights and liberties. While it may have been possible to blend this group of respondents within our expert respondents, we have chosen not to do so. Separating them from expert respondents indeed seemed to us interesting so as to evaluate the variations and divergences between our expert respondents and this population as regards to their opinions about OST.

Identifying this population of activist respondents has been done in a more exploratory way. Lacking a basic mailing list for this type of population, we have proposed to have the questionnaire mentioned in a posting in the blog of the French newspaper *Le Monde* in May 2009. This experiment was rendered possible thanks to some collaboration with the journalist in charge of the blog. The address of this blog is as follows: <http://bugbrother.blog.lemonde.fr>. This blog seemed to us interesting as it aims at questioning,

challenging and criticising surveillance practices and policies and is addressed mainly to activists and militants for the protection of fundamental rights and liberties. The questionnaire was put on-line on this site on May 12th, 2009, and has remained accessible till May 31st, date when we stopped collected data. We have collected through this blog an additional sample of 84 usable answers.

The activist population so contacted is made of 31% of women and 69% of men. This population is younger than that of the expert respondents, with 44% of the population aged between 20 and 30, 50% aged between 31 and 50. 6% are 50 years of age or more. As regards to backgrounds, the majority (56%) of this activist population are engineers and scientists, 23% have a background in the social sciences, and only 4% have a Law-related profile. Nationalities are ventilated as follows: 79% French nationals, 11% Belgian nationals, and 20% of various other nationalities. This majority of French nationals are due to that the *Le Monde* blog is a French-language website and thus mostly consulted by a French-language public.

In the remaining of this text, we will mostly base our observations and comments on the answers received primarily from our population of expert respondents. The activist respondents will be looked at in parallel in paragraphs entitled “The Activists’ Corner” when necessary and relevant, so as to comment and discuss divergences, and convergences too, between their positions and that of the expert respondents.

2. The Respondents’ Value Systems

A first set of questions we asked our respondents was that of the values underlying the functioning of a ‘society wherein one feels well’.¹ Their answers have allowed us, first, to extract an analysis of their value systems as regards to issues of wellbeing, the role and responsibility of the State as regards this welfare, and about the way our expert respondents conceives the privacy issues since they are tightly related to the OST development . Second, our results have also allowed us to draw a series of characteristic profiles of respondents.

2.1. Defining ‘A Society Wherein One Feels Well’

First as regards to our respondents’ value systems, the values necessary to a ‘society wherein one feels well’ are the freedom of expression, social justice and equality. When asked to range


7. In your opinion, what ought to involve such a “society wherein you would feel well”? Please pick and rank the three items that are the most important to you (1 = most important)	
	Rank (1, 2 or 3)
a. Freedom of expression	
b. Freedom of choice	
c. Material comfort	
d. Bodily security	
e. Equality as regards to rights	
f. Social justice	
g. Democratic participation/structures	
h. Healthcare for all	
i. Right to free association	
j. Right and respect of privacy	
k. Other (please provide details): ...	

the values required for such as society, the freedom of expression is rated 1st in 25% of the cases, the need for equality as regards to rights in 15% of the cases and for social justice in 12% of the cases.

When we analyse the responses received to this question and count the number of occurrences of each value, freedom of expression is mentioned in 54% of the cases, social justice in 50% of them, and the principle of equal opportunity in 43% of the answers. We also observe that

¹ The original question in French was about a ‘société où l’on se sent bien’. Due to issues with the translation of ‘bien’ which was likely to affect and guide answers, ‘well’ was chosen as a vague, but probably the most neutral translation.

democratic participation is cited as third most important value in 18% of the cases. It thus emerges that democratic values, though considered highly, are seen as requiring, as a preamble, a set of other values looked at by respondents as more important.



Secondly, we have extracted typical respondent profiles characterised by their value systems. Four main profiles have emerged.

Combining a valuing for freedom of expression, of choice, and respect for privacy, a first profile is that of the respondent emphasising the importance of *individual rights*. Without speaking here of individualism in its more pejorative and criticised meaning, we propose that this individualist profile looks out at autonomy and individual action as important and necessary. Respondents fitting this profile consider freedom as the founding value for individual action, individuals not being due to integrate specific social groups.

Combining a valuing of equality, social justice, and of ‘healthcare for all’, a second profile is that of the respondent emphasising the importance of *social justice*. This profile is more turned towards social issues, such as that of solidarity. These respondents praise the importance of collective actions and solidarity to regulate the society.

Combining a valuing of material comfort and bodily safety, a third profile is that of the *consumerist* respondent who emphasises the importance of more material criteria. Freedom, as well as solidarity, is here lesser emphasised as important in favour of material comfort and personal and bodily safety.

Combining a valuing of democratic participation and freedom of association, our fourth, and last, respondent profile is that of the respondent emphasising the importance of *political rights*. Respondents fitting this profile tend to conceive a ‘society wherein one feels well’ as dependant on the possibility for citizens to develop political activity.

If we look at our results with these profiles in mind, our results give the following ventilation for our respondents. 43% of our expert respondents seem to fit into profile emphasising the importance of *individual rights*. 37% of our expert respondents seem to fit into profile emphasising the importance of *social justice*. These are the two dominant profiles emerging out of our enquiries. Besides these two profiles, we also note that 11% of respondents emphasising the importance of *political rights* and 9% fit the *consumerist* profile .

2.2. On Privacy

A major notion we wished to explore through this questionnaire was that of privacy. We have thus confronted our respondents with contrasted conceptions of privacy, and asked their opinions and views on these.

10. In your opinion, the respect of privacy involves primarily ... (please tick the one item corresponding you best)	
	Tick one item
a. Be assured that no-one would enter my home without my authorisation, and intercept my mail, here including my e-mail	<input type="checkbox"/> 1
b. That my intimacy and personal opinions be protected, including when I am in public spaces	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
c. That I would have the right to be different, to lead a different way of life, without hindrance to my social life	<input type="checkbox"/> 3
d. That I would have the right to do what I want, when and where I wish	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
e. Other (please provide details) :	<input type="checkbox"/> 5

By combining the 4 items, we have ranged our respondents according to two contrasted visions of the privacy.


One was a rather political and collective conception of privacy (items c and d.). This conception that we will call a *politico-democratic* conception of privacy, looks at privacy as a right to be different and to personal autonomy, and insists upon the need for the possibility to

autonomous development in society. In this case, the respect of privacy is a crucial condition for a possible emancipation within a group.

The second was a conception of privacy – that we call *protectionist* – in which the protection of persons and their belongings was privileged (items a and b). This conception was found with our expert respondents privileging the protection of their intimacy and personal opinions as well as the protection of their belongings and personal communication devices, as their home, their e-mail, their phone... This conception of privacy insists upon the possibility for an individual to ensure the preservation and protection of information concerning him/her directly.

As regards to our enquiry, we have noted that 38% of the population studies fits a profiles having a *politico-democratic* conception of privacy while 62% of respondents display a *protectionist* conception.

We have also noted that conceptions and understanding of privacy seem to depend largely upon




the respondents' background. In fact, 61,1% of the Law-related expert respondents contacted seem to participate to a *politico-democratic* conception of privacy while 81,1% of the respondents coming from scientific or engineering background rather have a *protectionist* vision of privacy.

More in detail, among our sample, 11% of respondents are members of an association for the protection of privacy. Out of this, we may note that being member of such an association tend to come in parallel with a more *politico-democratic* vision of privacy. On the one hand, 45,5% of the members of such association present this vision of privacy. On another hand, 65,2% of respondents who are not members of such association rather present the profile of a *protectionist* vision of privacy.

These results show us how respondents active in Law-related domains and/or Law-related activities (here the example of an association for the protection of privacy) tend to participate to a *politico-democratic* conception of privacy and have a lesser restrictive and protectionist notion of their privacy.

2.3. On Governance

Another set of our questions to the respondents was related to their values in matters of governance and social regulation. To the question of ‘*who ought to be in charge of such a society wherein you would feel well?*’,



society wherein you would feel well?’, 49% of our respondents have emphasised the importance of the State as regards to this responsibility, while 44% of the respondents consider this issue part of a


good citizen’s own duties. We have thus grouped our respondents into two profiles. One profile is that of respondents having a ‘*State-view*’ way of conceiving of governance, the second that of respondents a *citizens-view* conception of governance.

To those fitting the *State-view* conception of governance, democratic States and governments are due to playing a central role in the regulation of society.

To those fitting the *citizens-view* conception of governance, the regulation of society is rather a *bottom-up* process; it implies an active participation by citizens and associations. In this model, the responsibility for constructing and regulating society rests with associations, non-governmental organisations, civilian society, and citizens’ activities.

The Activists' Corner: The Activist Population And Its Values

Unlike the expert respondents, the activist respondents are keen on promoting, as values for the definition of a 'society wherein one feels well', the values of freedom of expression, equality, and respect for privacy and social justice. This is quite clear in the graph below. The answers by the activist respondents quite reflect this population as mostly including active militants caring for the preservations of their rights against intrusion by observation and surveillance systems.



Concerning privacy, the trends identified about the expert respondents are also found about the activist population. About 60% of these respondents display a quite protectionist conception of privacy, the protection of privacy implying to most the protection of the right to personal intimacy and personal opinions. 40% of the respondents display a more political or democratic conception of privacy.

Concerning governance, a majority of 49% of our expert respondents emphasised the importance of the State as responsible and in charge of ensuring good governance and the social regulation. Again, our activist respondents similarly attribute this responsibility to the State.

By contrast, the two populations are quite different as regards to their knowledge of their rights related to video-surveillance and privacy. This knowledge, already quite limited among our expert respondents, is even more limited among the activist respondents, with

only 19% of them claiming knowing their rights. This result may seem quite surprising for a more militant population in as far one knows that the Law is a crucial element towards the regulation of OST.

3. On OST And Video-Surveillance Systems

A major part of our questionnaire consisted in exploring our respondents' visions and understandings of OST and the meaning they carry for them. It seems especially important for us to try to understand the meaning carried by OST for our respondents as regards to their *present state*, their *usefulness* and their *future*. The rather critical opinions expressed by our expert respondents in their answers to our questions as well as by activist respondents – these are discussed below – are no doubt to put in relation with the word 'video-surveillance' used throughout the questionnaire which implies some negative visions. This effect of the 'video-surveillance' term was however, only partly probably, counteracted by our introduction to the questionnaire. In this introduction, we explained that our concerns were with multi-modal observation technologies, however often better known as intelligent video-surveillance systems.

This survey is aimed towards the exploration of intelligent multimodal observational technologies, in simpler words advanced **video-surveillance** technologies. These technologies collect and analyse images and shots of faces (facial recognition), bodies (body tracking), and crowds (crowd surveillance). Usages can be varied: making public and private spaces safer and more secure, marketing and personalising services through the collect of information on consumers' habits. This survey aims at identifying the conditions for democratic development and usage of such technologies in the Society.


3.1. Intrusive, Little Useful... And Yet Reassuring

To our questions on their understandings of video-surveillance systems in modern societies,

14. In your opinion, video-surveillance systems ...						
	I totally disagree	I disagree	I neither agree or disagree	I agree	I totally agree	I do not know
a. Are not more intrusive than the social surveillance from people	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
b. Are primarily neither good nor bad, everything depends on the way they are used	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
c. Ought not to exist as they undermine personal liberties and rights	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
d. Are increasingly necessary due to the recent rise of insecurity	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
e. Are useful to assist people in their surveillance activities	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
f. Are reassuring for the population	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
g. Are useless, as such systems do not prevent insecurity	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
h. Allow for improved "man-machine" relationships, and thereby assist in improving daily life quality	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8

respondents have been quite critical against these systems.

Three main objections were formulated. First video-surveillance systems are seen by our respondents as *different in kind from, and more intrusive* than other more usual surveillance systems. Only 19% of our respondents find them similar. Second, these systems are not perceived as *necessary*. Only 17% of our respondents approve the idea of their necessity



to tackle growing insecurity issues. Third, 49% of respondents do not see any specific *usefulness* of these systems as a means to tackle insecurity.

These three critical objections suggest a certain aversion from our respondents to the use of this type of technology, even in case of insecurity problems. One ought to however be careful in concluding too rapidly that insecurity is no sufficient motive for the installation of video-surveillance systems. Indeed, insecurity is a rather vague terms that can have very varied meanings and this is likely to have affected answers to our questionnaire.

Beyond this rather negative view on video-surveillance systems, it is important to remind that, by contrast, 47% of our respondents evaluate these systems as useful if used to assist people in their surveillance activities and 39% think that these may have reassuring effects. These two elements reflect, we would suggest a certain technological paternalism shaping our respondents' views, wherein technology is entrusted with the capability to assist human rationality, reassure populations. This is a vision that seems shared by our expert respondents... with some distance however since 49% among them tend to evaluate these systems as useless for the prevention of insecurity.


3.2. A Neutral Technology?

Quite surprisingly, our expert respondents tend to display a certain technological relativism. Indeed to 53% among them, technology is primarily neutral, the opportunities and risks it generates are a matter of the aims it is used for, and the ways its usage unravels. This vision

on technology as socially neutral quite differs from that developed in the ‘Science, Technology and Society’ scholarship, where technology is conceived embodying human agencies and intents and as reflecting some choices that will shape up its impact on society.

3.3. A Users Centered Technology : Profiles And Preferences

Many intelligent video-surveillance systems allow for the dynamic management and profiling



of personal preferences, an issue we have confronted our respondents with through questions on profiling. Put briefly, profiling is not seen as efficient by our respondents. Only 1% of our respondents consider that the

functioning of profiling systems actually generates profiles corresponding to real preferences and opinions.

A direct consequence of this rather categorical view is that there is – if we follow our respondents – a strong need for individuals to be able to control the modalities by which systems extract and model their preferences. On this issue, 92% of our respondents think having a need to access, in an unlimited way if possible, how systems build up and manage preferences and profile. Some detailed information on profiling *per se* and the implications thereof thus seem crucial for these systems to become more readily acceptable to our expert respondents.

Also, the systems that manage preferences according to individual dynamic profiling techniques are perceived by 72% of our respondents as reducing possible personal choices and only 12% tend to consider this automatic management of preferences as allowing for more comfortable daily life.


3.4. Which Future For OST?

To prospect the future of OST, we have addressed a first very general question to our respondents.

17. In your opinion, what are the future prospects of video-surveillance systems? Please tick the one item corresponding you best.

	Tick one item
a. Very promising future prospects as these systems respond to many needs	<input type="checkbox"/> 1
b. Promising future prospects, despite the social resistance and legal restrictions these systems are likely to generate	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
c. Limited future prospects, as these systems are soon to be replaced by more performing ones	<input type="checkbox"/> 3
d. Limited future prospects as the use of these systems will face up rising legal restrictions and social resistance	<input type="checkbox"/> 4

For a large majority of them (59%), OST has a promising future despite the social resistance and legal restrictions these systems are likely to generate. This contrasts with the 25% who think that its future will be limited in reason of legal restriction and social resistance. This majority position is really interesting to note since it means that our respondents see those OST systems like a technico-industrial force that a Society through its legal settlement and its social movement could not stop or at least negotiate.




To some extent, this result raises worries regarding the capabilities a Society could develop to regulate the progress of those technologies.

If OST is promised to a bright future, which are the potential domains or sectors where it will be deployed? To support this questioning, we have suggested to our respondents a list of potential domains of development.

18. In your opinion, what are the likely domains of application wherein video-surveillance systems are the most likely to develop in the future?		
	Yes	No
a. Marketing, the surveillance of consumers' reactions allowing the personalisation of services	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
b. The security of public spaces and shopping centres	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
c. The protection of children	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
d. The security of buildings and technical facilities	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
e. The protection against terrorist threats	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
f. The assistance to elders and handicapped people towards an independent daily life	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
g. The control of foreign citizens at borders	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
h. The workforce surveillance in the workplace	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
i. The improvement of traffic safety	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
j. Other (please provide details):...	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2


Here again, for most of our respondents, OST have a bright future ahead of them. As illustrated in the graph below, more than 90% of the respondents foresee possibilities for development of OST mostly in relation to the domains of safety and security in public spaces and buildings, and to the containment of terrorist threats. This seems somehow paradoxical when one compares with the evaluation that these same expert respondents propose as regards to the inefficacy of these systems in matters of security and safety. It is as if these systems were no longer challengeable/incorporated into the normality of contemporary modern life. It is interesting to note here how one of the domains of application often quoted to legitimise the development of these technologies, that is, the assistance to elderly and handicapped people, is only noted by 57% of our respondents as an actual future domain of application.

18 - The likely domains of application wherein video-surveillance systems are the most likely to develop in the future



The Activists' Corner: The Activists On OST And Video-Surveillance Systems

The opinions expressed by activist respondents on OST and video-surveillance systems tend to be similar to those by expert respondents, though often more radical, as can be seen in the graph below.



More than 80% of the activist respondents find OST useless to prevent insecurity and only 8% do find OST as equally intrusive as more traditional surveillance systems. By contrast, more than 50% of our respondents seem to propose that these are conceived so as to reassure without, however, being effective at tackling insecurity issues. Here too, some sort of technological paternalism seems to affect opinions but in a more critical way. Our respondents seem to testify of a sort of placebo social effect upon the public/populations. As regards to technological relativism, this group seems rather to look at OST as embodying and/or shaped by human agency. Only 29,7% among them consider these systems as socially neutral.

As regards to profiling, by and large, activist respondents share similar objections as expert respondents to these practices and their implications, in a more radical way though. None of them consider indeed these systems as capable to extract and reflect their preferences correctly. As with expert respondents, more than 90% of activist respondents are keen on asking access and control upon the *intelligibility* of the systems.

Lastly, activist respondents, like expert respondents, also point out to the securing of public spaces and buildings as the most likely domain of application that may in the future sustain the development of OST.

4. On The Three MIAUCE Scenarios


This part of the report is devoted to an analysis of our respondents' opinions as regards to the three scenarios central to the MIAUCE project. For each of these scenarios, we explore respondents' opinions as regards to its usefulness, its necessity, and its impacts and correlated risks. The responses to this part of the questionnaire are quite radical and therefore have to be tempered by the fact the the presentations of the scenarios were very short and by then difficult to understand for an external respondent questioned by an 'one way media'. For instance, both for the marketing qscenarioio and the WEB TV one, we did not describe all the proposals made by our partners to moderate their societal impacts.

4.1. The Safety Scenario... Useful But Potentially Risky

The first scenario we asked respondents to reflect upon is a safety-related application. It entails the alerting of surveillance staff when 'abnormal' movements are identified by the system. Such 'abnormal' bodily moves are defined through the departing from average expectable bodily moves, average moves around which the system is configured. This scenario entails the use of body-tracking technologies. For example, if someone falls at the bottom of the escalator of a large airport, the system will be made so as to spot out this incident and launch an alarm signal on the screen, which will assist swifter interventions by security staff.

19. Do you think that...						
	I totally disagree	I disagree	I neither agree or disagree	I agree	I totally agree	I do not know
a. This scenario is useful	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
b. This scenario is necessary	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
c. Generally, this scenario will bear positive safety effects	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
d. This scenario may easily be applied to other contexts	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
e. This scenario may lead to discriminations	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
f. This scenario affects people's dignity	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
g. This scenario affects people's privacy	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
h. This scenario may assist in improving the vigilance by control staff	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
i. This scenario may lead to the de-responsibilising of control staff	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8

The results to our questions reflect previous comments and results on the vision of video-surveillance systems among our respondents. Indeed, 50% of respondents tend to evaluate this scenario as *useful*, which confirms our hypothesis that video-surveillance systems, as complex observation systems, are more likely to be seen as useful if they assist other human surveillance activities. Moreover, 39% of our respondents tend to propose this scenario as useful to prevent bodily hurt. By contrast, only 13% of respondents evaluate it as *necessary*. One ought probably to read this evaluation while taking into account the lukewarm views on their actual efficacy: only 39% propose that this scenario has the potential to improve surveillance personnel vigilance and 63% consider that it could lead to some form of diminished responsabilising of this same personnel. More telling are the kinds of risks perceived as due to this scenario. 74% of respondents propose that the technologies involved in this scenario could be redirected towards other aims and purposes. Further, 67% think that scenario and its related technology could be redirected towards unforeseen purposes may lead to some sort of discrimination and 55% that it could have negative fall-outs on everyday privacy. Compared to the other two scenarios, commented below, this first scenario seems to be however the one the better received by our respondents.




4.2. The Marketing Scenario... Useful For Marketing Practices... Putting Privacy At Risk

The second scenario we asked respondents to reflect upon is a marketing-related application. It entails the collect of information about the behaviour of consumers, towards their own interest – for instance towards the automated personalising of shopping advice – and towards that of store managers. For instance, cameras located on product shelves would track the motions of consumers’ eyes and associate these with the products looked at. Shelves and sales can thus be optimised.

22. Do you think that...						
	I totally disagree	I disagree	I neither agree or disagree	I agree	I totally agree	I do not know
a. This scenario is useful	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
b. This scenario is necessary	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
c. Generally, this scenario will bear positive marketing impact	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
d. This scenario may easily be applied to other contexts	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
e. This scenario may lead to discriminations	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
f. This scenario affects people’s dignity	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
g. This scenario affects people’s privacy	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8

As hinted above, the results from our questions are here quite clear as regards to the little usefulness of this scenario, among others once compared with the precedingly commented Safety Scenario. Only 8% evaluate this scenario as useful and only 2% defend its necessity. By contrast, 40% perceive how such a scenario may impact upon marketing strategies effectively. The rather critical evaluation of this scenario is probably to be put in relation with the likely threats it carries as regards to intrusion of privacy. Indeed, 83% of our respondents think that this scenario carries along risks for the respect of privacy, and 67% think it may have discriminatory side-effects. The graph below is an illustration of this critical evaluation of this scenario.




4.3. The Web-TV Scenario... A Puzzling Scenario

The third scenario we asked respondents to reflect upon is an entertainment-related application. It entails the personalisation of internet television access. This system is aimed the identification of Web-TV users' preferences through a Webcam-based technique for the facial recognition of emotions. Profiles and preferences are identified on the basis of facial expression of emotions, of mouse movements, and of users' expressed choices. This way, the contents proposed to users may become increasingly personalised.

23. Do you think that...

	I totally disagree	I disagree	I neither agree or disagree	I agree	I totally agree	I do not know
a. This scenario is useful	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
b. This scenario is necessary	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
c. Generally, this scenario will bear positive impacts for the comfort of users.	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
d. This scenario may easily be applied to other contexts	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
e. This scenario may lead to discriminations	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
f. This scenario affects people's dignity	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
g. This scenario affects people's privacy	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8

This scenario has been the most criticised out of the three. In their answers to our questions, only 7% of respondents have found it useful and no respondent evaluated it as necessary. Although this application of OST is centred on the improvement of life of its users, only 7% of respondents think it may bring any effective improvement. It is quite likely that these rather radical opinions may reflect a fear, worry, shared by 82% of respondents, regarding the potential risks from such technology for privacy, or, for 67% of them, regarding potential social discrimination side-effects. These risks are even more present as this technology is easily usable in quite different contexts.



The Activists' Corner: The Activists On The MIAUCE Scenarios

The opinions expressed by our expert respondents as regards to the three MIAUCE scenarios are also found in the answers by our activist respondents. Thus they are 35% to evaluate the Safety Scenario as useful, 15% for the Marketing Scenario and 9% for the Web-TV Scenario. Again if opinions are in principle similar, they are somehow more radical on the part of activist respondents. This is especially the case as regards to the risks these applications of OST may mean in terms of privacy intrusion. Thus more than 80% of our respondents consider that the Safety Scenario risks to affect the privacy, and more than 90% express these same worries for the two other scenarios.

5. Which Social Acceptability For OST?


So as to better know the conditions for the social acceptability of OST among our respondents, we have asked them a series of questions aiming at highlighting their views on three issues, the possibility to influence the design of OST and how, the issue of OST observing them in their routine life, and their opinions as regards to the future of OST. We summarise below the results of our analysis of our respondents' responses to this questioning.

5.1. You As Designer Or As Decider Of OST

The first set of questions we wish to discuss was concerned with the respondents' putative opinions if in the hypothetical position of being the designer or decider for future OST. We wished to see what they were ready to accept about the future system under design.

15. If you were to manage or participate to a research project on video-surveillance technologies, would you agree to integrate the following specifications?						
	I totally disagree	I disagree	I neither agree or disagree	I agree	I totally agree	I do not know
a. The observation of physical particularities of the body, of the face, etc.	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
b. The possibility for the system to devise decisions based on the data related to bodily features	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
c. Entrusting private operators with the system's future management	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
d. The cross-examination of the collected data with other data collected by other systems	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
e. The capture of images and data without informing the concerned persons	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
f. The possibility of favouring job losses due to the system's development	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
g. The possibility for the system to exert direct influence upon users' behaviours	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8

As the graph below shows, if the observation of bodily features is somehow still seen as acceptable for 26% of our respondents, as well as the possibility for crossing data across various systems, for 18% among them, certain elements are simply seen unacceptable by than 90% of our population.




What is at stake here is the *intrusive* and *normative* characters of the technology, especially so as only 6% of our respondents think they may accept a likely actual influence upon users. Another major issue is that of the possibility of *collecting data without the informed consent* of the people concerned. Only 7% of our respondents seem ready to authorise such collecting possibility. A third issue has also attracted our attention, the fact that only 6% of our respondents would be ready to entrust the management of future systems to *private agents and operators*. This distrust towards private agents and operators also arises other questioning. It is as if our respondents would trust better public authorities. This seems paradoxical, if one notes too that most legal system aiming at the protection of privacy have been originally created to impede the intrusion by the State in the sphere of privacy. It is less so, however, if one takes into account how privacy intrusions and high performance of data collecting systems are maybe no more to be found in the public but rather in the private sector. For instance, 53% of our respondents do consider that the major threats for privacy mostly originate from the private firms when only 28% of them turn their regards towards the public authorities.

5.2. You... As Observed Individual

A second set of questions we asked our respondents was concerned with their everyday living surrounded with cameras, in public spaces as well as private ones too.

16. How do you accept the following features of video-surveillance systems?						
	I do not accept at all	I do not accept	I do not mind	I accept	I totally accept	I do not know
a. The omnipresence of cameras	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
b. The fact of not knowing of who manages the system	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
c. The fact of not knowing what usages can be made of the collected data and images	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
d. The fact that decisions affecting me may be framed on the basis of such images	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
e. The fact of feeling under surveillance	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
f. The fact of being filmed without my knowledge	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8

On this issue, as illustrated in the graph below, respondents have emphasised several factors conditioning, in their opinion, the social acceptability of the usage of OST. The first of these factors is the need for *transparency*, transparency about the later usages of collected images and data. This reflects a clear claim for a complete information on the intelligibility of the systems in exploitation and on the agenda pursued by systems managers and operators. Thus we note that only 2% of our respondents would tolerate not knowing the usage of the data collected on their behalf and 3% ignoring the identity of the systems operator. The combination of the *omnipresence of cameras* with their *invisibility* is pointed at by our respondents as also very problematic. Indeed, only 5% of our respondents accept the observation of their daily routine by omnipresent, and often invisible, cameras. This is confirmed by the difficulty resented by 91% of the respondents with *feeling observed* in private and public spaces. As a last point, as already commented earlier about, the potential *normative* role of OST, of which usage can be extended towards *decision-making*, is also a major issue. Only 9% of respondents would agree on accepting this development.




As seen here above, a major issue regarding the social acceptability of OST for our respondents is that of the *transparency of systems*, that is, their requirement for some information about the systems, their usage, their operators and managers, and the overall intelligibility of its process.

This requirement for transparency and intelligibility of the systems is very well shown by the results collected to the question about the impact of current information made on the presence of cameras, being in public as private spheres.


29. Is being informed of the presence of cameras reassuring for you? (please tick the one item corresponding you best)

	Tick one item
a. Yes, absolutely	<input type="checkbox"/> 1
b. Yes, but I ought also to be informed on the likely uses of the data collected	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
c. No	<input type="checkbox"/> 3
d. Other (please provide details):...	<input type="checkbox"/> 4

The responses to this question show the general non satisfaction of our experts regarding the information at disposal to the public concerning the presence of cameras. Based on these results, one can conclude that the current information is far from being assessed as responding to the requirements pointed out by our experts regarding the intelligibility and the transparency of the system.



When asked, in more general terms, if they think that they are sufficiently informed about OST, answers are quite telling. As illustrated in the graph below, only 4% of our respondents evaluate the information disseminated by systems operators as sufficient. This fits very well



with the previous observation regarding the information at disposal about the presence of the cameras. More generally, respondents also think that

people is insufficiently informed on OST. According to them, such information is mostly disseminated by associations (30% of our respondents), the medias (20% of our respondents). Public authorities as 'academic' sector, in this specific matter, seem to be seen as quite too discreet at disseminating such information.

5.3. You And Your Acceptability Of OST


A last set of questions was about the kind of systems our respondents would, in their current understandings, agree to tolerate and accept.

13. More and more video-surveillance systems are being installed in public as well as private spaces. What is your opinion?		
	Yes	No
a. I can accept such systems if aimed at children's protection	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
b. I can accept such systems if aimed at the containment of terrorism	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
c. I can accept such systems if aimed at the protection of my property (house, car, company, business...)	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
d. I can accept such systems if aimed at improving urban safety	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
e. I can accept such systems if aimed at easing up my everyday life	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
f. I can accept such systems if managed by a public authority	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
g. I can accept such systems if managed by private agents	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
h. I can accept such systems if my anonymity remains preserved	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
i. I can accept such systems if their use does not lead to discriminations	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
j. I can accept such systems if proven efficient towards finalities I judge legitimate	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
k. I can accept such systems if proven necessary towards finalities I judge legitimate	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂


81% of our respondents highlight their tolerance for the usage of OST provided that the aims and purposes pursued thereby appears to them as legitimate. Out of the list of purposes proposed by us to respondents, three emerge as legitimate for less than 50% of the respondents: the *protection of children* (48% of respondents), the *securing of public spaces* (46% of respondents), and the *containment of terrorist threats* (45% of our respondents). The identification of these three purposes as legitimate for a part of our population raises up the paradox of our respondents' ambivalent position to OST, that is, their critiques of their practical inefficacy and uselessness at tackling insecurity issues and their habits to nevertheless subscribe to the trust these with such protecting capabilities. Lastly, we also note that more than half of our respondents did not identify among the purposes we proposed them any that they would evaluate as legitimate. These results invite to further public debating on the purposes and agencies underlying OST so as to identify the legitimising criteria that would allow their development in the respect of a democratic society.

The Activists' Corner: The Activists On The Social (Un-)Acceptability Of OST

As with the issues commented earlier of value systems, perception of OST, and the MIAUCE scenarios, the activist respondents appear to propose the same kind of opinions as our expert respondents, but again in a more radical way. As developer or designer, 92% among them think they would refuse contributing to the development of *systems aiming at the observation of personal bodily features and characteristics*. Similarly, 89% of our activist respondents would refuse to cross-examine data and information coming from different sources. The *intrusive and normative* character of OST is also received by criticisms from 99% among them, who would refuse on any decision being made on the sole basis of information collected through OST. Lastly, activist respondents seem to share our expert respondents' *distrust of private operators*, with 99% among them refusing to contribute to the development of systems if entrusted to such private operators. A difference does exist between our two populations regarding the main threats to privacy: when the expert population considers for 53% of them that the threat comes mostly from private firms and only 28% from the State, the proportion is just the reverse here with a large part of activists - 47%- that considers that State as a major source of threats. This is understandable when considering the nature of the BLOG that has supported the posting of the on line questionnaire to the activists and which is very orientated to the critiques of the large public surveillance systems.



As regards to issues raised by being observed, the activist respondents are quite critical of observation and surveillance practices. The whole of the population does not tolerate being observed, and more than 97% among them refuse systems that would not be wholly transparent concerning the possible usage of data as well as the systems' operators and managers. Systems that would allow making decisions based on the collected images and data are equally criticised. In brief, the activist respondents do refuse situations wherein they are not informed about the purposes, agencies and readability of the systems and their outputs. This is also confirmed by the two next results : 70% out of them do consider that being informed of the presence of a camera is not reassuring them and only 1,2%, as shown by the graph below, find that people are sufficiently informed and aware of OST by the manner of the system.



Quite interestingly, when asked to develop prospective considerations on OST, we have noted that only 61% of this population would agree to tolerate future developments of these systems even if the underlying purposes for such development were deemed legitimate. This reflects and confirms the rather critical and cautious opinion of this population on systems that they feel as threatening fundamental rights and liberties. As regards to the purposes that may be deemed as legitimate, the only one that emerges as justifiable is that of the protection of children, accepted as such by 34% of the activist respondents. Again this ranked lower than among the expert respondents. 48% among them deemed this purpose as legitimate.

6. Regulation

The last section concerns the regulation of the OST. This regulation is a crucial issue when considering the social and ethical impacts those systems can have on our everyday life.

In this section, we will first question our respondents regarding the need (or not) of public debate regarding the deployment of an OST system in a public as in a private space. Secondly, we will question our respondents on their responsibilities regarding this regulation: what are they prepare to do to defend their rights and positions when facing OST. In the third and last part, we will address the question regarding the specific roles and responsibilities of the public bodies in charge of the protection of privacy.


6.1. Public Debate: An Urgent Democratic Requirement

A first very general question regards the need to set up public debates regarding the OST.

27. In your opinion should the installation of surveillance cameras be subjected to public debating?	
<input type="checkbox"/> ₁ Yes	
<input type="checkbox"/> ₂ No	
If yes, debates ought to explore (please tick the one item corresponding you best):	
	Tick one item
a. The decision to install or not a video-surveillance system	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
b. The modalities of exploitation and usage of video-surveillance systems, as well as the conservation of collected data	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
c. Other (please provide details):...	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃

As shown by the following graph, a very large majority of our respondents, 92%, point out the need for such public debate. This important majority indicate well that the OST issues and



regulations need to be urgently supported by democratic deliberation involving all the concerned stakeholders.



What should be the scope of this public debate? For 51% of the respondents it is the decision itself to install or not a system of OST that should be democratically deliberate through public debate. 29% consider that it is mostly the usage of the OST and its modalities of exploitation that should be at stake in such public debate. And a majority of the reminding 20% underline in textual comments that for them both of these scopes are crucial to be democratically deliberated.

To validate these first results, we have put our respondents in situation of facing a deployment of an OST system in order to better approach their visions of the needed regulation. Two questions were raised: one regards the deployment of OST in public space, the other its deployment in private space. Regarding the regulation of this decision, three possibilities were suggested to the respondent: to leave the decision to the public or private body in charge of the system, to leave the decision to the citizens or the consumers concerned by the system or to entrust this decision to public authorities in charge of the privacy protection. The results do confirm the previous trends even if they are less radical than when related to a general statement.

First of all, as shown by the graphs below, only a minority of our respondents are prepared to leave this decision in the sole hands of the operator being public (37%) or private (24%).



For a deployment in a public space, most of them (65%) consider that the population should be consulted and partner of the decision through the organisation of a public debate. Logically, this claim for public debate is less marked for a private installation (42%) since in this case both the scope of the ‘public’ and the legitimate basis to organise such a public debate are difficult to approach.

The role of the public authority in charge of the protection of privacy rights appears very crucial or critical for our respondents, since it is required by 55% of them for a deployment in a public space and for 60% in a private space. Interesting to note is the difference between the two profiles we have drawn regarding the concept of privacy of our respondents. For instance, the *protectionists* are much more in favour of a regulation exercised by the authority in charge of the protection of the privacy rights than the *politico-democrats* who consider that it is primarily a question of public debate.

6.2. Citizens’ Actions : a Constructive Sense of Resistance

This part does concern the actions and responsibilities our respondents do consider the citizens should take in charge in order to defend their position and protect their privacy in relation with OST’s development. Those questions aim to understand the concept our respondents have about the citizens’ responsibilities when facing social and ethical issues

raised by OST. In order to not approach this responsibility too theoretically, here again we put our respondents in the citizen’s situation.

The first question was about what they are prepared to manifest their disapproval against the presence of OST systems.

33. Would you be ready to express your disapproval against the presence of surveillance systems?

1 Yes
2 No


If yes, what do you think of the following modes of action?

	I totally disagree	I disagree	I neither agree or disagree	I agree	I totally agree	I do not know
a. Calling in at the organism in charge of the protection of your right to privacy	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
b. Seeking to avoid places wherein these observation systems are installed	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
c. Signing a petition against such systems	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
d. Joining an association for the protection of privacy rights	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
e. Manifesting publicly your opinion	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
f. Disguising yourself	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
g. Sabotaging observation systems	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8
h. Other (please provide details):...	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 8

First of all a very large majority of them are ready to express this disapproval since 82% of them respond positively. This seems to mean that people – at least our experts- do not intend to stay passive or inactive when facing issues or problems raised by OST systems.

The second part of this question was about the means and the ways our respondents would mobilise to express their position. As shown in the graph below, a large majority of our respondents do mobilise what we could qualify *means of constructive or positive resistance* to contrast to *means of defensive or negative resistance*. For instance, 84% of them are ready to sign a petition to express collectively their position. But more significantly, 82% of them would call an organism in charge of the protection of the privacy rights. This important percentage shows also the critical role those organisms have when considering the wek means they have at disposal in a majority of European countries. It seems also interesting to point out that our respondents are for more than 60% of them ready to engage themselves more actively in order to defend their positions either by joining an association for the protection of privacy rights or by manifesting publicly their opinion. All those percentages give some empirical evidence to the critical issue that OST represents for our respondents and therefore their


willingness to involve themselves in a public deliberation or questioning of those technologies. By contrast with this constructive resistance or attitude, the different ways or means more defensive to prevent them to be observed by OST seem less favoured by our respondents. In fact, even if 48% of them should seek to avoid places wherein these observation systems are installed, they are less than 20% prepared to take active measure to avoid OST systems as disguising themselves (26%) or sabotaging OST (18%).



To organise those actions and to legitimate them, people are supposed to know the legal frame that regulates the privacy’s protection. It is therefore interesting to question our respondents about their personal knowledge of this legal frame. The results are quite telling: 46% claim having some knowledge of this frame, while 54% ignore it. This result is rather surprising for our population of expert respondents about whom one may have arguably presupposed some culture of their legal rights. If one looks more in details at the profile of those claiming to know their rights, we note that this category includes 83% of the Law-related expert respondents, though 17% of these expert respondents admit not knowing their rights.

6.3. Role of the Public Bodies in Charge of the Protection of Privacy: Critical Expectations

As we have seen before, the legitimacy of the public bodies in charge of the protection of privacy and its critical role for OST's regulation are widely confirmed by our respondents. This general trend is confirmed by the fact that for a very large majority of our respondents, as shown on the graph below, the protection of citizen's privacy is mainly a matter of the public responsibility of the State.



If the public authorities in charge of the privacy's protection are highly legitimated by our respondents, it is interesting to question them first of all about their personal knowledge of those bodies and secondly about their perceptions of the social usefulness of those bodies.


31. Do you have knowledge of independent bodies entrusted with privacy protection issues?

₁ Yes
₂ No


32. In your opinion, what is the social usefulness of such independent privacy protection bodies? Are these aimed at:...

	Yes	No
a. Protecting citizens' individual rights?	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
b. Promoting public debating?	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
c. Promoting legislative changes?	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
d. Ensuring the respect and implementation of laws and regulations?	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
e. Other (please provide details):...	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂

The results are telling. First of all, they show that 66% of our respondents have an effective knowledge of public bodies entrusted with privacy protection. This means also that one third of them do not have this knowledge, which is a quite high rate when considering that the respondents are experts.




Their opinion regarding the usefulness of such bodies testifies of large social expectations regarding such bodies. All the suggested items received more than 80% positive responses. The highest rates do concern the protective role of the privacy bodies as protecting citizens and ensuring the respect of laws and regulations. But still, 81% of our respondents do consider that such bodies have also a more active or political vocation by promoting public debating.





All those comments claim for a reinforcement of the responsibilities and means of the public bodies in charge of the citizens' privacy protection. They also indicate a clear demand of our respondents for the setting up of democratic debates regarding the policies and the practices of OST in our Society.

The Activists' Corner: The Activists On The Regulation Of OST


The activist respondents appear to propose the same kind of opinions as our expert respondents, but again in a more radical way. First of all, as far as public debate is concerned, 97% of them do consider that the installation of OST system should be submitted to a large public debating and according to them, this debate should primarily concern the decision of the installation rather than its modalities of use and exploitation.



Placing in the concrete case of the installation of OST systems in public or private spheres, the activists seem however better to entrust this decision to public bodies in charge of privacy's protection rather than to support this decision by a public debate with the concerned stakeholders.




When questioning them about the different ways to express their disapproval against the presence of surveillance systems, they also claim for different actions belonging to what we have called *'the positive or constructive resistance'* as calling at the organism in charge of the privacy's protection, or signing a petition, or manifesting publicly their opinion. However, by comparison to the experts' population, a greater percentage of them could involve themselves in more defensive strategies as disguising them or sabotaging the OST system. This is quite congruent with the 'nature' of the activists' population.



More telling is the very low percentage of them showing a personal knowledge of the privacy's protection legal frame that could support their actions and claims: they are only 19% who tell having this knowledge. If this knowledge is still low for what we could consider as a very concerned population, one could be really worried about the state of knowledge of the population in general... This claims clearly in favour of a wider popularization of the legal frame in order to reinforce the capabilities of all the stakeholders to participate actively to the democratic reflexion about those technologies.

As the experts, the activists' population do consider for a very large majority of 78,5% of them that the protection of the privacy's rights is mainly of the responsibility of the State. This is a bit maybe paradoxal since this population consideres at the msame time that the major threats for their privacy come from the State... But their responses indicate, as for the experts' population, important expectations regarding the public bodies in charge of this protection. This is well pointed out by the graph below showing that the social usefulness of

such body is proven by more than 90% of them for its three traditional roles: protecting citizens' rights, promoting legislative changes, ensuring the respect of the law.



Conclusion and Recommendations

The results presented in this section could appear quite black and pessimist for those who involve politically or technologically in OST systems.

First of all, we would again point out that this pessimism is somehow generated by the term 'video-surveillance' used in the writings of the questionnaire even if we define cautiously the systems targeted by the questionnaire all along it... If 'video-surveillance' is very commonly known by our questioned populations, it is also widely negatively connoted in its general meaning and especially regarding the threats for the privacy.

But, on the other hand, from a democratic point of view, those cautious opinions testified by our respondents are quite heartening concerning their willingness to set up these OST systems on legitimate and democratic bases. From this point of view, the general trends shown by those results give some empirical evidence about the need to better inform people about the issues of those OST systems and to democratically deliberate about their diffusion in the Society.

Several recommendations emerge from this survey.

General Awareness

First of all, we can point out a real need for a wider popularization of information concerning OST systems. This information does concern first of all the general intelligibility of those systems and their related issues for the Society. This is dramatically raised by the very low percentage of respondents who consider being sufficiently informed about OST. On this information's front, we have seen that the media seem the more active. This means at the same time that there is large avenue for campaign of awareness led either by the public authorities as by the academic world.

Legal Awareness

This lack of information does concern also the legal frame that regulates the privacy rights and more generally the OST systems. To some extent, this legal frame remains very obscure for our populations and this result is quite worrying when one considers the backgrounds of our populations and their involvement into the domain either as experts or as activists. This claims in favour of pedagogical work to popularize those frames amongst the citizens. The

clear explanation of these legal frames and their appropriation by the population is critical for the reinforcement of the collective intelligence and therefore for the development of a democratic society based on matured and deliberated decisions.

Reinforcement of the Assets of the Public Authorities in Charge of privacy Protection

The public authorities responsible for protecting the individual rights as regard the privacy and more generally the civil liberties are for our respondents a critical node for the regulation of the OST systems. This node as deployed in most of the European countries is suffering of lack of human means and of authorities to sustain the wide expectations people have about its role. It claims both for reingforcement of their means and authorities but also for innovation in their organizational settings in order to make them more accessible for an effective protection of the individual rights of the citizens.

Intelligibility of the OST Systems

As raised by our respondents, if the informed consent is a basic condition to socially accept the OST's systems, the current signalling of camera presence appears not sufficient to reassure and to inform the population about the purposes, the management and the functionalities of the OST systems. For most of our respondents, those systems have to be more readable or transparent regarding their finalities, their processes and their managers/owners. This transparency is for our respondents one of the most critical condition to make OST systems socially acceptable. This requirement for transparency can be red as a political demand of a balancing of powers between the system and the concerned population.

Accessibility to the OST Systems

The accessibility of the systems and more precisely the right for people to have access to the data collected on them and processed about them but also to correct those data in case of misunderstanding is also a critical factor to make those OST systems socially acceptable for our population. This claim has a very strong social meaning when considering the very low trust our populations have in the profiles and preferences generated by those systems. Her

again, this requirement must be read as a political demand for a fair balancing of powers between humans and systems.

Legitimacy of the OST's Finality

Setting up OST's systems on legitimate finalities is also a major condition for the social acceptability of those systems. This is well pointed out by our respondents. However, those legitimate finalities appear difficult to identify... This is well addressed by our respondents when suggesting them some commonly programmed finalities (as protection of children, fight against terrorism, etc.). This is also dramatically demonstrated when considering the very pessimist assessment of the MIAUCE scenarios. This difficulty raises a major question regarding the social usefulness of those technologies seen by our respondents as reassuring the population but as not having effective impacts on the security, as assisting staff in their surveillance activities but at the same time as diminishing their sense of responsibility.

This question of legitimacy claims both for being more innovative regarding the social directions that could take those technologies but also for collective and democratic deliberation to assess the legitimacy of those finalities.

Democratic deliberation

All the results gathered by this survey demonstrate a critical need for the organisation of democratic deliberation about OST systems. This need does concern both the societal issues that those technologies raise for the Society and the specific deployment of such systems in our every day life. As well pointed out before, this deliberation could foster the legitimacy of the settlement of those technologies in our Society but also generate a collective intelligence regarding domains and issues that those technologies could support.

The question raised by the democratic deliberation regards its organisation and the relevant process that should support it. Through the MIAUCE project, we have tested some patterns for this democratic process. They are fully detailed in the chapter 1 of this report.

Part 2 : Focus Groups: Looking for ‘Majorities’, ‘Common’ and ‘Precarious’

Introduction to Focus Group : a qualitative method

This first part of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the Focus Groups organized by University of Namur in 2008-2009. The major aim of a Focus Group is to provide information about preferences and values of targeted citizens (8 to 20) on particular topics. Given presence of a moderator, a focus group is a kind of focused interview which undertook a discussion group.

Focus Group is a qualitative method very helpful in order to assess the nature and intensity of stakeholders’ concerns and values about the deliberated issues.

We have organised six Focus Groups, hereafter ‘FG’, in French-speaking Belgium, each of which was structured as follows.² The first theme was that of the values underlying ‘a society wherein one feels good’, the conditions required for its existence and its constraints and limitations. The second theme was the three MIAUCE scenarios, which were submitted to an assessment, covering issues of their social acceptability. Thirdly, and lastly, participants were asked to elaborate on some potential recommendations to EU authorities.

MIAUCE Focus Group’s structure

1. Brainstorming about the conceptions of a « well-being society »

- How do we define a well-being society (3 criteria)
- What are the conditions allowing a well-being society?
- What’s against a well-being society?

2. MIAUCE’s project presentation

- MIAUCE’s project (governance, partners, scenarios, technologies)
- Security Scenario : description, objectives, technologies
- Marketing Scenario: description, objectives, technologies
- Web-TV Scenario: description, objectives, technologies

3. Assessing the scenario

- What are the negative / positive consequences implied by each scenario?
- Is it a useful / helpful scenario?
- Is it a necessary scenario?
- What kinds of public do the scenario and the technologies concern?
- What kinds of places do the scenario and the technologies concern?

² Cfr the appendices to this report that include the powerpoints prepared for the FG and the detailed reports that ensued.

4. What kind of social acceptability?

-Does the scenario satisfy to the requirements of:

Justice?

Equality?

Freedom?

(please explain your choice)

- May the scenario discriminate? If yes/no, why?

- May the scenario weaken social links? If yes/no, why?

- How do you connect the requirements of a “well-being society” and the scenario contingencies?

- What kinds of ruse or resistance can you imagine concerning the scenario?

5. Recommendations

- What kind of recommendations would you address:

- Concerning the public funding of these technologies?

- Concerning the social and legal responsibility of the public decision-makers?

- Concerning the development of the technology?

1. The Participants: Majoritary, Common and Precarious

The participants selected for these FC were, first, a group of about 20 trade union workers participating to courses at the *Ecole syndicale* of the CNE, the *Centrale Nationale des Employés*, second, a dozen followers of French classes at the CIRE, the *Coordination et Initiative pour Réfugiés et Etrangers* (French being a foreign language for the participants to these classes), third, the members of the Namur Rotary Club, and, fourthly, a dozen of prison staff and a dozen of prisoners of Arlon prison.

1.1. The Typology : Justification

We propose to use a typology inspired by analyses by Le Blanc, *Vies ordinaires, Vies précaires*, and by Deleuze and Guattari, authors of *A Thousand Plateaus*, which suggests to categorise our sample as made of people ‘precarious’, ‘common’ and ‘majorities’. We will look at the prisoners and French classes followers as the ‘precarious’ category. The penitentiary staff and the trade union workers will be looked as the ‘common’ category, and the Rotary Club members as the ‘majorities’.

Through these FC, we have been looking towards highlighting the social and economic tensions separating ‘majorities’, ‘common’ and ‘precarious’ in the French-speaking Belgian society. Our main problem following on from the on-line survey was about who would arguably be identified as falling under one or the other label. The questionnaire was indeed insufficient to reveal these groups and make them express their opinions. On the one hand, the

‘precarious’ were generally a disseminated category, most likely to lack an easy access to internet and on-line resources - the Digital Divide indeed often leads to difficult access to, and use of computerised interfaces and internet. On the other hand, the literature survey on the acceptability potential of the MIAUCE scenarios – realised as part of the second deliverable³ – also led us to the realisation of video-surveillance systems leading out to exclusion phenomena. Some of the persons filmed in the classic situation of video-surveillance usage in public space may suffer from later discriminations based on their skin colours, gender, age and/or clothing. In this sense, video-surveillance usage accentuates discrimination. The ‘precarious’ being characterised by a negative, disqualified, excluded social identity, it thus seemed appropriate to use the FC method to obtain opinions out of ‘precarious’, ‘common’ and ‘majorities’.

1.2. Presentation of the Panels

The FG methodology implies the contacting of people sharing specific characteristics and common interests, the so-called ‘stakeholders’. We consider as the ‘majorities’ those whom Deleuze and Guattari categorise as the ‘standard/norm’,⁴ that is those serving as reference, example of social normality; that means classically the white man, the ‘WASP’, the ‘upper middle class’ individual. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari indeed develop a theory of minority politics wherein majority and minority are assessed using quantitative arguments but rather through an exploration of power distribution in society. In their words, this means that:

“When we say majority, we are referring not to a greater relative quantity but to the determination of a state or a standard in relation to which larger quantities, as well as the smallest, can be said to be minoritarian: white-man, adult-male, etc. Majority implies a state of domination, not the reverse. It is not a question of knowing whether there are mosquitos or flies than men, but of knowing how “man” constituted a standard in the universe in relation to which men necessarily (analytically) form a majority”⁵

This approach of looking out for the ‘common’ and ‘precarious’ was part of our will to highlight the existence of a public, of an audience to the MIAUCE multi-modal video-surveillance scenarios. This was inspired by our reading of the literature, which seemed to us to suggest the targeting of fragile and economically and socially unstable population groups.

³ See the surveillance studies : www.surveillance-and-society.org

⁴ Deleuze et Guattari, « *A Thousand Plateaus* », London : the Athlone Press, 1988, p. 291.

⁵ Idem, p. 291.

Collecting opinions on the part of these groups meant for the possibility to let another kind of public, usually deprived of public visibility and expression, to let its opinions known. The FC were in this sense oriented towards revealing communities sharing specific interests as regards to technologies. Towards this purpose we have chosen to visit prisons, where we talked with prison staff and prisoners, to contact refugees, and trade union workers. To sum up, it was so as to show off the existence of a silent public to the three MIAUCE scenarios, and provide alternative discourses on social acceptability that the FC were organised.

According to Le Blanc, the 'common' [ordinaire] is an individual who constantly negotiates with social norms so as to maintain a decent way of life. This objective of a decent way of life is promoted by the author in his 2007 *Vies ordinaires, Vies précaires*, where he argues for 'caring' politics, inspired by the feminist ethics of 'care'. The 'ordinaire' has a social function, among others through his participation to the workforce, to consumption practices, etc. Norms, rules, social conventions are taken into account, ingested by the 'ordinaire', and his/her ordinary life is characterised by the latter ingestion. The freedom of the 'ordinaire', the white man says, consists in playing with and against these norms, rules and conventions that are as much qualifications. It is thus that one becomes equipped to explore the precariousness and instability of a disqualification. In this category of 'common', we find the CNE *Ecole syndicale* participants, made of union trade workers (among others out of the distribution and transports sectors) and the prison staff at Arlon. In some ways, this 'ordinaire' category thus includes workers to whom the 'Marketing' and 'Safety' scenarios are full of meaning as regards to their professional activity. This special meaning of safety, and surveillance technologies, in particular was quite clear in relation to security and safety staff, e.g. prison staff. Union trade workers were on their part quite sensitive to issues related to the 'Marketing' scenario.

The 'précaire' individual, in a quite contrasted way, is rather best defined by his/her invisibility and inexistence in the democratic social system, leading out to a trend in studies devoted to the 'subalterns'. *Can Subalterns Speak?* is a founding text of the so-called 'Subaltern Studies' that attempt to give space for the expression of those lacking it. In this sense, feminist studies have also claimed on the need of solicitude, calling for caring politics, on the need to look for and care for exception, e.g. Butler, and the rights of minority, e.g. Deleuze and Guattari.⁶ The 'précaire' is one who exists despite being the antithesis of social

⁶ Strictly speaking Deleuze and Guattari are not feminist writers. What we mean here is that they display the same kinds of concerns than feminist authors.

normality, the one whose career has emerged despite his/her not contributing to performance normativity, or profitability, etc. As the prisoners in Arlon answered when asked “what is a society in which one feels well?,” “why asking this question? We are not part of society; we are outside of it.” This acute consciousness of being excluded, out of the game is shared by other groups, such as refugees, jobseekers, and refers to the social normal imperatives such as wealth, security and safety, freedom. The ‘précaire’ is out of the game, beyond the reach of power, and deprived of public voice. This inclusion of the ‘précaire’ is thus a reflection of one of our desires to include in our exploration of the voices of an alternative public on acceptability issues. Following on Le Blanc, speaking for the ‘precarious’ is an endeavour of mutual translation between the language of the ‘precarious’ and that of the ‘majorities’. As he expresses himself:

“Trying to fix the concept of precariousness, it would be, beyond the double effort of translation – translation of political words in the precarious language, translation of precarious language in the philosophical language-, a contribution to the restoration of the precarious voices, too rapidly removed from the concert of the modern democracies. “⁷

As such we wished too that the public we were creating would include some of these invisible individuals, these ‘useless’ individuals excluded by society. More in practice, our work, though using the methodology of FG, has involved a rather limited number of applications. In some ways, thus, our results only have a limited, mostly exemplative, value. They nevertheless are a useful complement to the on-line questionnaire, and have at the least the merit to allow for the collection of opinions of well-focused social groups. Also, we also wished to collect the opinions of two additional groups, that of the young individuals (up to 25 years old) and that of the elderly people (aged of 60 years or more). These two groups, despite several attempts on our part, have declined our invitation to participate to a FG. Mostly they did show little interest in video-surveillance issues. Specifically, no member of the *Fédération des Seniors*, where we disseminated the invitation through the monthly journal, has manifested any interest in the FC, and students at the *Faculté d’informatique* of the University of Namur, where we are based, have similarly not shown off interest for the FG. Could it be that this lack of interest is witnessing of a relative of interest for videosurveillance and privacy issues among the youngest and eldest layers of Belgian society? The question remains open but it seems in the first instance that this may mean that these two groups feel relatively little concerned by these problematics. Such reflections are

⁷ Le Blanc, G., *Vies ordinaires, Vies précaires*, Paris, Seuil, 2007, p.18. My translation.

however to be formulated carefully: most members of the Rotary Club were indeed all quite older, being all about 60 years of age or more.

2. The values : Consensus and Divergences

2.1. *The ‘Precarious’*

THE PANEL

The CIRE, the *Coordination et Initiative pour Réfugiés et Etrangers* as mentioned above, is an association (ASBL) based in Brussels. The FG was organised with the participation of about 10 foreign students learning French at the *Ecole de Français Langue Etrangère*. There was an equal proportion of men and women. Students were between 25 and 45 years of age.

Arlon prison is a medium-sized men’s prison, counting between 120 and 130 prisoners. The institution includes a temporary arrest section destined to accused individuals, and one more proper prison part where convicts are being kept. Dating back to 1867, the facility is rather decayed. The 7-people group is exclusively made of man, aged between 25 and 45 years.

THE VALUES EXPRESSED

When asked about the values of a ‘society wherein one feels well’, the ‘precarious’ emphasise the importance of human capital. Values as security and safety, equality, tolerance and congeniality and conviviality are put forward as crucial. If safety and security and freedom have rather extended meaning for this category, equality is, by contrast, rather understood rather narrowly as also implying the possibility of jealousies, and temptations for theft, and delinquent for instance. Tolerance is understood rather broadly, and implies the acceptance of differences; and conviviality is the quest for harmonious relationships between individuals. What sustains this ‘society wherein one feels well’ are the traditional values of the ‘active social State’ promoting and providing for healthcare, education, social solidarity, employment, and vital needs. The countervalues and issues threatening such society are those of violence, corruption, unemployment, social and economic gaps.

2.2. *The ‘Common’*

THE PANEL

The ‘common’ panel is made of students of the *Ecole Syndicale* of the CNE. It is a mixed group of about 20 people aged between 30 and 50. We also include in this category the Arlon staff prison, all men, aged between 20 and 60.

THE VALUES EXPRESSED

The most cited values are those of security and safety, respect, fulfilling of vital needs, e.g. healthcare, minimal comfort, the ability to relate to a group, that is, not being isolated or lonely, social justice and stable employment. Education, respect for the Law and rules and regulations and a relatively important policing force are also mentioned as ingredients for a ‘society wherein one feels well’. Contrary ingredients are identified as potentially coming from unemployment over-consumption habits, and the lack of social contacts.

2.3. The ‘Majorities’

THE PANEL

We contacted the Gembloux Rotary Club – the Rotary Club is a charity society gathering liberal professionals (as physicians, lawyers, retailers, etc.) but also managers of public and private firms and teachers of which activities include the organising of social events such as conferences, social events, and also the sponsoring of further education (travel bursaries). The aim of this group is the networking but also the financial support to some associative associations. Participants were 12 aged between 45 and 65.

THE VALUES

The values pointed at in this group of ‘majorities’ as regards to a ‘society wherein one feels well’ are those of freedom, understood as the freedom of association and movement, family values, and security and safety. What allows and sustains this society are values of work endurance and State laws and regulations. Violence, lack of respect for rules and regulations, especially in youngsters’ education, mafias and corruption are highlighted as antithetical to such a society.

2.4. Consensus and Divergences: Values vs. Meaning(s) of Security and Safety, Freedom, and Respect

Unlike what may have been expected, some values have emerged out of the FC as common to all our categories of ‘precarious’, ‘common’ et ‘majoritaires’ to refer to a ‘society where in one feels well’, those of *security and safety, freedom, and respect*. These three values seem unanimously shared. We need however to add a few remarks. First, freedom and respect are mentioned by all categories but are rather polysemic, and the most likely to diverging meanings. By freedom and respect, it is most of all the wide domain of privacy and intimacy that is enacted. Respect for freedom to move, associate, choose, prefer, although formulated

by all categories of participants to our panels, does not equate with individuals all participating to the same social, economic and political exchequer. It is for example this generic notion of freedom that is invoked by all when commenting on the dangers of profiling enacted by the 'Marketing' and 'Safety and Security' scenarios for instance.

This same remark on issues of polysemy can also be expressed about the value of security and safety. Safety and security are indeed words of which meaning change quite severely if invoked in contexts of terrorism in public spaces, or risks of accidents or of personal aggression. What is safety and security about? About reassuring? About protecting? About preventing? About repression? The situations chosen and evoked by the panellists are all expressions, or at the very least symptoms, of the anxieties of a felt contemporary or forthcoming 'control society', announced by Deleuze,⁸ and/or of Beck's "Risk Society."⁹

All in all, all of our panellists have expressed a certain reserve it not 'complaints' against this 'control society'. The most telling is their demand for more 'human' relationships, for more social harmony. What is at stake here is the issue of the man-machine. Many regret an idealised past era, with no computer, no television, no everyday technologies. Back then, time was better spent discussing, playing, or at fulfilling diverse tasks all engendering of better-quality relations that were more human, more authentic. It is 'technology' that would be the cause behind this social deliting, this abusive individualism, leading out to an additional dose of deep anxiety between persons. 'Technology' would also be the cause to massive job losses, machines replacing man in its productive function; machines being incapable of humanity, they would be at the core of the crumbling down of social relations and the growing social atomisation. Lastly, technologies and technical apparatuses such as those enacted in the 'Web-TV' scenario are also pointed at for 'intruding and affecting personal intelligence', leading to uniformisation of thought and a reductive smoothing of choices and preferences. What is advocated and pointed at here is the paradoxical contemporary taste right for each to preserve his/her particularism. It is this emphasis on the freedom to choose and preferences that highlights individualism as common value among our panellists.

⁸ Deleuze, G., « Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle », in *L'autre journal*, n° 1, mai 1990.

⁹ Beck, U., « Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity », New Delhi: Sage, 1992.

3. The Scenarios : A Contrasted Assessment

3.1. *'Safety and Security' Scenario (SSS)*

The 'Safety and Security' Scenario, hereafter 'SSS', is that which has, in the same time, generated the most consensus and critical debates among our panellists, especially as regards to its evaluation. On this particular level, there were quite some divergences. If all agree on that such SSS is useful as regards to 'safety' issues, opinions diverge as regards to the aimed public and audiences – at the very least as regards to the identification of the latter. The 'majorities' will mention at street gangs as the targeted groups; the 'common' will point out that anyone may become the target of such SSS; the 'precarious' will speak out of émigrés and refugees, coloured people, roofless people – or 'Sans Domicile Fixe', 'SDF' in French jargon –, poor people, ...

Positive consequences of the scenario are mostly found as regards to the assistance to surveillance, counter-terrorism security, to prevention. The usage of such SSS also has been strictly regulated to be acceptable. Still there remain some strong critiques against this SSS.

In this respect, the 'precarious' and the 'common' highlight that even if a camera is present on premises, it is not sufficient to stop people from falling. In some sense, the aimed purpose of caring for people's safety is not achieved. Then what is the real purpose? Towards the claimed purpose, would it not be better to increase the number of security and safety staff around? Also, the installation of such systems does it not mean a lesser number of safety and security staff, does it?

On this issue, the Arlon prison staff has noticed the multiple functions that cameras may take. If cameras are indeed there to assisting surveillance staff, what stops that the collected images and data not be used against this very staff? On the one hand, surveillance staff do not have access to personal data and images, and nothing guarantees that these may not be used against them. Moreover, they emphasise, these devices induce social paranoia atmosphere, of which human and professional relationships suffer. They speak out of anxieties of a world in which everyone is recorded in files and wherein information may at any time be crossed-checked with other ones and made contribute to non-retroactive profiling.

All in all, all our panellists have formulated some questioning as regards to the notion and definition of normality and abnormality enacted as left out to the subjective appreciation to its user (relatif et aléatoire), similarly as for the confusing polysemic notion of safety and

security. What is an abnormal behaviour? Will the system be flexible enough to integrate all the variants of ‘normal’ variations, for instance a running child, or are we to worry of rather constraining systems? How are engineers to calibrate? On which basis? All panellists also tend to ask questions as regards to their personal data, the collect of these, and their likely usage towards other ends.

As regards to the targeted groups to control, the ‘precarious’ and the ‘common’ all seem to think that this kind of technology is likely to lead to discriminations, for they tend, they claim, to weaken social bounds and relationships, and take as a target poor people, and weaker individuals. Moreover, they argue, video-surveillance also implies a social de-responsabilising process; it is likely that the belief will grow that cameras will take over the collective responsibility of the care for accidents in public spaces. They also note that the installing of cameras in large public spaces lead to the feeling of a paranoiac, repressive society in which ‘risk-zero’ situations are a priori precluded.

More or less all our panellists have noted too that there are risks as regards to privacy and intimacy intrusions due to the presence of cameras. They comment on that ‘the eye looks out for the observing camera’ and vice versa, and that h-behaviours get affected, moulded by that feeling of being observed. For them, it is impossible to resist the attraction of these technologies; one feels forced to endure them.

3.2. ‘Marketing’ Scenario

The assessment of this ‘Marketing’ Scenario, hereafter ‘MS’, by our panellists has been quite varied and contrasted. In this case, the contrasts do not seem to be shaped up by our categorisation between ‘majorities’, ‘precarious’, and ‘common’. A certain consensus seems to emerge however on the issue that this kind of technology may induce the consumption of products that are neither crucial not even remotely needed, and, more problematically, the ‘formatting’ and ‘standardisation’ of their preferences and tastes. Risks with profiling are perceived as such and all panellists highlight the potential threat to individual freedom. A risk of socio-economic discrimination is also perceived, this by the three categories. The awareness that such MS system provides little if no retroactivity is important. There is a clear fear to become manipulated by an opaque technological system, as well as of privacy and intimacy intrusion. No panellist has mentioned any kind of usefulness or necessity for this MS scenario.

Instead, the ‘majorities’ have highlighted the fact that this MS scenario may cause damage to the process of shopping itself, as a human activity, which, in their understanding, consists in wandering freely round between products shelves and explore the products on display.

Discussions also highlighted the issue of the little relevance of public funding of such technologies. Another point made was also about how such MS ought not to be used as a way to control employees, and of protection against thefts. Some panellists however see some positive impacts for producers or managers of large-scale stores. Still, all in all, all panellists have under questioning the potential little practical usefulness of of the scenario.

3.3. ‘Web-TV’ Scenario

To start with, the ‘precarious’ and the ‘common’ have highlighted the issue that this scenario pre-implied the regular access to a computer as well as an internet connection. This means for that the ‘Digital Divide’ is no myth and has real practical implication. For instance, prisoners pointed at their non-access to the internet. More in general, if panellists see in this WTS a potential help towards more comfortable use of Web-TV programmes, many rather highlight the risks of social atomisation, crumbling and damage to social relationships and, as with the MS commented above, of ‘formatting’ and ‘standardisation’ of preferences and tastes. Overall comments pointed at the technology as intrusive. Comments also mentioned that emotions are not universal, and some fear of having one’s preferences cast, typified, and potentially manipulated towards ends other than personal comfort. No panellist found any particular practical usefulness to the scenario.

More tellingly, panellists have developed some questioning on issues of consent. To what extent was consent to such WTS fully informed? How does one know what is actually subscribed to? Are we sure that terms and conditions will be respected, interestingly telling on the fear of risk of manipulation? To close, as for the MS scenario, panellists have challenged have put down questioning on the limited real – as opposed to presumed – usefulness this WTS may bring.

4. Recommendations

We have asked all our participants to formulate some recommendations towards EU authorities as regards to, first, issues of public funding and financing, second, the policy making that should regulate the technologies, and, lastly, to technologies *per se*.

4.1. About the Public Funding and Financing

On the issue of public financing, the first main comment from our participants relates to the pertinence and relevance of structural financing of the ‘Marketing’ and ‘Web-TV’ scenarios, in as far as they rather conceive these as benefiting the private and not the public sector. Why do European scientific policies support such project? This seems to have shocked a large number of participants as these scenarios do not aim at reaching any kind of ‘common good’ ideal. Only the ‘Safety and Security’ scenario seems to have some kind of legitimacy among our panelists on this issue of financing. The second comment relates to the kind of contents supported by European funding schemes. The ‘precarious’ and ‘common’ would advocate better financing for healthcare, culture and education, as well as violence prevention projects, which is why, they think, policy makers turn to videosurveillance systems.

4.2. About the Political Regulation

On the regulation, the three panels seem to share the same requirements.

- The legal and ethical regulation of videosurveillance systems should be more explained and popularized amongst the population
- The creation of overseeing control organism as regards to the usage and exploitation of personal data, with some advocacy that such control body would be made of citizens.
- The privileging of human capital as regards to technologies, the need of more local policing for instance.
- The possibility to gain easy access to stored personal data, and to act on these latter (possibility of deletion, procedures to make these invisible)

4.3. About the Technology

Lastly, as regards to recommendations related to technologies per se and their development, our panellists seem to advocate and/or emphasise:

- Research aimed the ‘common good’, and individual welfare
- The need to enforce the respect of regulations as regards to the design and production of technologies.

Conclusion (to be completed)