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OVERVIEW

Constructions of speech and thought representation

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Abstract

A lot of what humans communicate about concerns cognitive contents of various kinds produced by others or themselves: speech, thought, writing, emotional states, attitudes, hopes, and the like. Languages have developed specialized ways to structure the representation of such contents, especially in various dedicated forms of speech and thought representation. Represented content can also include embodied behavior, such as gesture, whether in cospeech gesture or in sign language. What is represented need not actually have been previously produced: represented contents can be future, hypothetical or nonexistent, and forms of so-called fictive interaction can be used in which the model of face-to-face interaction is used to talk about a variety of other meaning types. Speech and thought representation presupposes the existence of two speech events—a current and a represented one—and each comes with a speaker, defined linguistically in terms of their central deictic coordinates, *I—here—now*. The interplay of deictic features and different forms of structural integration can define specific types of construction, showing different degrees of access to the embedded mental space of the represented speaker's speech or thought, such as direct, indirect, and free indirect speech or thought. Social media forms of direct speech or thought merit separate investigation, as do subjective uses of reporting clauses such as *I think*, which form a distinct construction type, using a subset of the grammar of speech and thought representation for different purposes.

This article is categorized under:

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KEYWORDS

(free) indirect speech or thought, direct speech or thought, fictive interaction, reported speech, speech and thought representation

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1 | INTRODUCTION

A lot of what people talk and write about concerns the words and thoughts of others or of themselves, whether real or imagined. This is true across a broad range of text genres and contexts of interaction: novelists, newscasters, lawyers, students and scholars, professionals of all stripes and everyday conversationalists all report on what was said or thought in order to provide access to viewpoints, build on existing authority, contest ideas, spice up conversation, dramatize events narrated, and so much more. One prominent social media platform, the microblogging site Twitter, provides a good illustration: a very important share of its content revolves entirely around other people's discourse being commented on, particularly in the form of so-called quote-tweets, in which the “quoting” Twitter user provides a textual and/or visual response directly above the “retweeted,” quoted tweet (Vandelanotte, 2020). There is, then, no overstating of the importance of speech and thought representation in all manner of human discourse. The special fascination linguists have long had for it is captured in Vološinov's (1973, p. 115) characterization of it as “speech within speech, utterance within utterance, and at the same time also *speech about speech, utterance about utterance*” (italics original).

An early topic of philological enquiry, from the late nineteenth century onwards, concerned so-called free indirect speech or thought (on which more in Section 3.2.1), considered a “peculiar mixture of direct and indirect speech” (*eigentliche Mischung direkter und indirekter Rede*) by Tobler (1887, quoted in Vološinov, 1973, p. 142), and the subject of intense scholarly debate especially in France and Germany (see, e.g., Bally, 1912a, 1912b; Lerch, 1914; Lips, 1926; discussions in Pascal, 1977; and translated excerpts in Cohn, 2005). This focus on forms of speech and thought representation in literary fiction, exemplified for instance in Hernadi (1972), Pascal (1977), Cohn (1978) and McHale (1978), remained an important strand of research, and of course lives on in different forms to this day, but the arrival of Banfield's influential (1982) study firmly parked a linguistic tank on the lawn of speech and thought representation research. Her work aimed to incorporate sentences representing speech and thought into a grammar of narrative sentences—“unspeakable” because in her theory narration is noncommunicative—compatible with the then dominant version of formal syntax. A special place was reserved for sentences of free indirect speech or thought, treated as narrative sentences reflecting a SELF or subject of consciousness. While Coulmas' (1986a) volume further cemented the linguistic approach to speech and thought representation, Ehrlich (1990) provided a study of Woolf's literary style in the vein of Banfield (1982), and Fludernik (1993) presented an impressive array of evidence illustrating the many possibilities for representing speech and consciousness in literary fiction. In the field of corpus stylistics, Semino and Short (2004) brought in modern corpus techniques used on large corpora of speech, thought and writing representations to test and expand on the stylistic model first presented in Leech & Short (1981, chapter 10), with forms from indirect over free indirect to direct increasing in faithfulness to the words or thoughts of the character.

A by now classic paper worth highlighting is the paper by Clark and Gerrig (1990). In it, they explore the nature of direct speech quotations as “demonstrations,” that is, nonserious actions that are selective depictions: in quoting someone, you are mimicking rather than genuinely performing a speech act, and only important, nonincidental aspects of the “original” are being depicted (such that, for instance, a quote by the Russian president will naturally be given in English in an English language newspaper). This theory was partly anticipated in Wierzbicka's (1974) “dramaturgical” theory of quotation, in which the quoting speaker imaginatively “poses as,” or acts out the role of, the quoted speaker; the notion of depiction, on the other hand, was further elaborated into a fully fledged theory in Clark (2016).

The few points of reference introduced above are inevitably selective, and lay no claim to representativeness of the field, let alone exhaustivity. Rather, they serve to sketch in some useful background against which to interpret the contributions of functionally and cognitively oriented linguistic research surveyed in the remainder of this article. Section 2 expands on some of the notions just introduced to consider what we mean by speech and thought representation at a basic, conceptual level, combining general discussion with more specific contributions by cognitive linguists. Section 3 moves on to an analysis of types of speech and thought representation in present-day English, and tries to show how notions of deixis and mental spaces, but also a functionally inspired understanding of syntactic combinatorics, combine to offer some focal points in a potentially diffuse landscape of possible forms. Section 4 presents conclusions.

2 | BASIC CONCEPTUAL NOTIONS

In this section, we review important aspects of the notion of “speech and thought representation” mentioned in the title (the other component, “constructions”, will be addressed briefly in Section 3.3), in order to clarify the larger notions lurking behind these necessarily summary terms. Section 2.1 looks at, and expands on, the notions of speech and

thought; Section 2.2 tackles that of representation; and Section 2.3 brings in the specific cognitive-linguistic notion of fictive interaction.

2.1 | “Speech and thought” and more

Perhaps one of the most traditional names used in this area of grammar is that of “reported speech” (e.g., Coulmas, 1986b), with its limitation to just speech alone, though “discourse” may also be used. While “thought” seems an obvious addition, it does not tell the whole story, in that other types of “mental” content like feelings, attitudes, hopes and even, to a degree, perceptions can reasonably be included too, on the grounds that they can appear in similar constructions and have related meanings: consider, in this connection, the possible use of reporting clauses like *she felt*, *he believed*, *they hope*, *I hear (you’ve been promoted)* (compare *people tell me you’ve been promoted*), *I see (that you’re right)* (compare *I think/understand that you’re right*). The area of clausal complementation involving different types of verbal, mental and related meanings is a vast and complex one that cannot be summarized here (see, e.g., Halliday, 1985; Noonan, 1985; Davidse, 1999; McGregor, 2008; Gentens, 2020), but it is clear that much is possible beyond strictly “saying” and “thinking.” Semino and Short (2004) explicitly included writing, too, as in *Eliot wrote that he’d soon return*, though they also note that writing is quite close to speech: indeed, in the terms used in Relevance Theory (e.g., Carston, 1999; Iwata, 2003), both spoken and written utterances are publicly accessible whereas thoughts are not. As is well known, more “colorful” verbs are sometimes used which do not even seem fully verbal or mental; of particular interest is the group of so-called behavioral verbs (intransitive in grammar and partly physical, partly psychological in meaning), proposed in Halliday (1985), exemplified by *smile*, *frown*, or *sob* (e.g., “Yes,” *she sobbed*).

Using “speech and thought,” then, can be understood as shorthand, focusing on the main categories, broadly conceived, but not excluding adjacent meaning types like writing or feelings, and fully allowing for indeterminacy as well. Indeed, it has often been noted that the quoted utterance following the relatively “new” quotative *be like* may be indeterminate in this respect (Buchstaller, 2014): in saying *And I was like, wow*, it is not categorically clear whether *wow* was actually said (probably not), thought in so many words (perhaps not either), or might best of all be understood as capturing an attitude of surprise, not necessarily verbalized or “thought.” There is a more fundamental point, however, and one which recent work on multimodal corpora of language use is bringing into sharper focus: with the relatively newer quotative forms *go* and *be like* in English in particular, what is “demonstrated” or depicted in the terms of Clark and Gerrig (1990) or Clark (2016) can be nonlinguistic, including gestural and (nonlexicalized) vocal (e.g., “brrrr”). Clark & Gerrig (1990, pp. 781–782) already illustrated this following the verb *go*, borrowing observations and examples from Hudson (1985). Recent work by Hsu et al. (2021) provides many contextually rich examples from talk show settings, including (1), in which actress Zooey Deschanel relates an experience boarding an airplane with her baby daughter:

1. and they were like, no, like, the people who get on first pay a lot of money for this privilege and I was like, but [*moves both arms back and forth parallel to frontal plane, elbows bent, both palms up, left palm placed on top of right palm*]. She needs to go on the plane. (Hsu et al., 2021, p. 11)

Where the first use of *be like* involves a depiction of the linguistic utterance made by airline staff, the self-quote following *I was like* is largely taken up by the gestural depiction of Deschanel rocking her daughter. This is obviously neither speech nor thought, and detailed study of multimodal data progressively allows a fuller picture of types of depicted content to emerge, including in sign language (e.g., Shaffer, 2012; Vandenitte, 2022).

A final nuance worth adding to this debate around speech and thought is that both can be at play, depending on the discourse level being considered. Dancygier (2012, chapter 7), in her cognitive analysis of the language of stories, devotes a chapter to examples of speech and thought in the narrative, starting from the observation that speech representation constructions are very often co-opted into the representation of thoughts and feelings across languages. To cite one example from her wide-ranging investigation, consider the imaginary conversation in (2). In the lines preceding the excerpt, the character Dave is imagining the worst has happened to his younger brother Toph whom he left with a babysitter—he imagines blood on the walls, and imagines there will be a trial:

2. *How did you come to meet this man, this baby-sitter?*
We found a posting, on a bulletin board.

And how long did your interview of him take?

Ten, twenty minutes. (Dave Eggers, *A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius*, qtd. in Dancygier, 2012, p. 173)

These lines present apparent *speech* exchanges between an imagined judge and Dave, standing trial for neglect, presented in the so-called zero quotative form (Mathis & Yule, 1994), that is, without reporting clauses like *I said*. What is *speech* at this lower level of a future, imagined scene is at the same time part of Dave's feverish, anxious *thoughts* in the "present" of the narrative. While it is tempting to treat speech and thought as clearly defined categories, there may in fact be indeterminacies between the two that can be creatively exploited by communicators, as well as other kinds of depicted content not accurately captured by either.

2.2 | "Representation" of speech and thought

The notion of quotations as "demonstrations" or depictions introduced in the Introduction has already been shown to have the advantage of including different types of "content" being depicted. It is also useful in avoiding the assumption, often implied in pedagogical grammar exercises, that a specific, preexisting original always exists. Constructions of speech and thought representation *represent something as* speech, thought, or some other demonstrated content, irrespective of whether this content actually occurred. Von Roncador (1980, 1988) was among the first to clearly articulate the range of cases where this intrinsically does not apply, including future (*X will say Y*), hypothetical (*if X were to say Y*), counterfactual (*X could have said Y but didn't*), negated (*no one has ever said Y*), and typified (*a psychologist would say Y*) or otherwise "nonverbatim" cases (such as those using the forms *so and so* and *such and such* as part of the quoted content). As an example illustrating this nicely, consider this excerpt from a *Vogue* interview with Edmund White:

3. I'm trying to express inner feelings in the most honest way possible. If you feel something reprehensible, you say it. I get very heated up *when somebody comes along and says, 'That's looksist, or ageist, or sexist, or blah-blah.'* It reveals total lack of comprehension of what art's really about. (Cobuild corpus, UK magazines component, qtd. in Vandelanotte, 2009, p. 122; italics LV)

Here, the speaker is any potential speaker who has an objection to a work of art; and what the speaker says could be one among any number of objections against a perceived discrimination, whether based on looks, age, sex, or anything else (with "blah-blah" acting as a placeholder for further examples).

The fundamental observation that no real original needs to "precede" an instance of speech or thought representation is a recurring one, found, for example, in Tannen's (1986, 2007 [1989]) notion of "constructed dialogue," Clark and Gerrig's (1990) exploration of "verbatimness" expectations, or Fludernik's (1993) central thesis of the *illusion* of mimesis created by such constructions. None of this is to deny the existence of some prominent contexts of usage in which faithful reporting of an actually occurring original is essential: in legal, journalistic or academic contexts, for instance, not adhering to faithfulness requirements may open one up to charges of libel or plagiarism. It does, arguably, render problematic taking faithfulness as the basis for a full-scale model of speech and thought representation in the vein of Leech and Short (1981) and Semino and Short (2004) (see, e.g., Vandelanotte, 2009, pp. 244–255 and Vandelanotte, 2021, p. 139).

A firmer grounding of what speech and thought representation involves can be found in McGregor's (1994, 1997) functionally and semiotically inspired notion of framing, which captures the idea that the quoted content is set apart, "framed" or delineated from its surrounding co-text, giving it special semiotic status as a linguistic entity rather than as a direct representation of experience. Similar notions include Halliday's (1985) metaphenomenon, Clark and Gerrig's (1990) demonstration, and the relevance-theoretical notion of metarepresentation (e.g., Noh, 2000; Wilson, 2000). McGregor's (1994) discussion helpfully heeds against the temptation to view demonstration and description as mutually exclusive, or as applying to direct versus indirect speech respectively: it is not the case, for instance, that because direct quotes are demonstrations they do not also "refer to, and describe some state of affairs, or some world" (McGregor, 1994, p. 81). Against views which would treat direct speech reported clauses as just "mentioned sounds" (Haiman, 1985, p. 224), and supporting McGregor's point here, one can point to the examples Partee (1973) discussed of anaphora and ellipsis taking place across quoted clause and surrounding discourse; one such example is (4), in which *he* refers to the quoted form *George Washington*:

4. The sign says, "George Washington slept here," but I do not believe he really did. (Partee, 1973, p. 417)

Nor, McGregor argues, should one conclude that indirect speech reports must therefore be descriptive: rather, *all* forms of speech and thought representation involve demonstration, but they demonstrate their referents from different perspectives—for instance, from within the represented speech event in direct speech, but (mostly) from within the current speech event in indirect speech. We will return to this question of different speech events and their associated deictic centers in Section 3. First, we need to add a further basic concept that has proved highly influential in cognitive linguistic research on speech and thought representation to date: fictive interaction.

2.3 | Fictive interaction

The previous section stressed the idea that what is represented *as* speech or thought need not actually have occurred at all, or with such and such specific words, mainly by pointing to contexts where the prior existence of an “original” is logically precluded. A broader point has emerged from work initiated by Pascual (e.g., Pascual, 2014; Pascual & Sandler, 2016), who studied how the frame of a face-to-face conversation is routinely used in language to “structure mental, discursive and linguistic processes” (Pascual, 2014, p. 9). The usage can cover a broader range of phenomena, also including, for instance, cases where a communication verb is interpreted “fictively” (e.g., *my watch says it's 12 noon*) or where inanimate objects are telling us something (as when a cotton tote bag “says” *I'm not a plastic bag*), fictive speech acts (as when people say *Call me crazy, but...*), and uses of apparent direct speech snippets at levels of structure below the clause, as in (5):

5. An *I love you no I love you more* routine (Pascual, 2014, p. 63)

A possible “type of thing one might say” in an exchange (such as “I love you” responded to with “no I love you more”) thus becomes emblematic of the particular attitude or experience it can be related to metonymically (Dancygier, 2021, p. 6).

An ambitious part of the fictive interaction research paradigm relates to language typology (e.g., Pascual & Sandler, 2016): where in English and some other Standard Average European languages the notion may appear to be mainly a “type of creative language use” (Spronck & Casartelli, 2021, p. 2), many languages around the world use apparent speech constructions to grammatically and entirely conventionally express meanings as varied as mental states, emotional and attitudinal states, desires, intentions, attempts, states of affairs, causation, reason, purpose and future tense (the listing is that given in Pascual, 2014, p. 90 with terms used as intended there). Consider an example such as (6), from Wan (a Mande language of Ivory Coast):

6.	<i>yī</i>	<i>ē</i>	<i>gé</i>	<i>bā</i>	<i>kó</i>
	water	DEF	say	LOG	boil
	‘The water was about to boil.’ (lit., ‘The water said: let me boil!’)				
	(Nikitina, 2020, p. 88)				

As Spronck & Casartelli (2021, p. 2) point out, the literal translation of (6), showing the water “incit[ing] its own boiling,” is not what the example *means* (rather, the meaning is inceptive: “be about to”). To investigate such cases crosslinguistically, they propose to use the term “extended reported speech,” to avoid conflation with the more creative usage types seen in English and similar languages. As a promising research field, fictive interaction can connect cognitive linguistics with existing typological research into speech and thought representation (e.g., Buchstaller & van Alphen, 2012; Güldemann, 2008; Güldemann & von Roncador, 2002; McGregor, 1994, 2008, 2019, 2021; Spronck & Nikitina, 2019).

3 | FORMS OF SPEECH AND THOUGHT REPRESENTATION IN ENGLISH

The main emphasis in linguistic research on speech and thought representation in English (on which we will focus attention here) has been on types such as direct, indirect and free indirect speech or thought, which involve some reported content (typically a clause, though it can be another utterance type including a single word like *hi* or *wow*)

being “projected” (Halliday, 1985) by a reporting clause such as *she said*, which in some types may be optional (more on this below). Before we briefly sketch some main features of these types, it is worth mentioning that other ways of (1) providing access to reported content, and of (2) referring to acts of speech and thought representation even without “demonstrating” the content, do, of course, exist. As to the former, phrases and adverbs like *according to X* or *allegedly*, and even adjectives such as *so-called* or *putative*, can signal the presence of the discourse of others. They can be seen, in the tradition of the influential cognitive linguistic theory of mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1994 [1985], Fauconnier, 1997), as mental space builders, opening up a cognitive “packet” distinct from the “base space” of reality, for instance the space of someone’s discourse (*according to X*), of a different era, location or domain (*In the Tokyo of the 1990s...*, *In the field of immunology...*), or of various epistemically or emotionally marked representations distinct from present reality (*What if...*, *Imagine if...*, *I’d like to...*). As to forms referring to speech or thought acts without “projecting” their content, the stylistic models proposed by Leech & Short (1981, chapter 10) and Semino and Short (2004) group these in the categories of narrative reports of speech or thought acts, the most indirect kind of reference to another’s discourse exemplified for instance in *He answered with a grunt*, *She talked on*, or *He replied very little*. Within a mental spaces framework, Sanders (2010) included such narrative reports of speech and thought events (the latter under the rubric of “implicit viewpoint”) in a study of the intertwining of journalists’ and characters’ voices in journalistic texts.

In the remainder of this section, we will briefly set out some of the main features of direct and indirect (Section 3.1) and of free indirect and related (Section 3.2) forms of speech and thought representation, and also briefly reflect on the status of “constructions” in this connection (Section 3.3). The perspective adopted is, for reasons of space, necessarily synchronic, but it is worth stressing that the categories presented in the sections below of course did not come to English grammar fully formed, nor are they immutably fixed (see, e.g., Grund & Walker, 2021). A fascinating exploration of the history of quoting speech in Middle and Early Modern English is Moore (2011), which among other things charts the history from marking authoritative passages in manuscripts using different marginal marks as well as “inquit” formulae (e.g., *said she*), to new conventions introduced in the era of print, including italics, parentheses around reporting clauses, and eventually quotation marks. During a long period, then, conventions were not fixed, meaning that the distinction between direct and indirect speech was not as clearly established as it later became. In example (7), for instance, from Chaucer’s *Canterbury Tales*, what initially looks to modern eyes like indirect speech (*they said they trusted that...*) turns out to use first person pronouns (*our*, *us*) appropriate to direct speech:

7. ... þ^t they sayn

They trowe / þ^t no cristen Prince wolde fayn

Wedden his child / under oure lawes swete

That vs was taught / by mahoun oure pphete

‘... *that they said / They trusted that no Christian prince would want to / Wed his child under our blessed laws / That were taught to us by Muhommed the prophet*’ (Chaucer, *The Man of Law’s Tale*, qtd. from the Hengwrit manuscript, folio 115r, with original underlining, in Moore, 2011, p. 166)

The represented speakers in (7) are members of the privy council of the sultan, who wants to marry the Christian daughter of the Roman emperor; in an indirect version, then, the pronouns *their* and *them* would be expected where this passage has *our* and *us*. Typographical conventions such as quotation marks later helped to fix the direct and indirect types more clearly, though indeterminacies may still occur.

3.1 | Direct and indirect speech or thought

Section 3.1.1 will discuss the main differences between direct and indirect speech or thought in English, before zooming in briefly on a particular cognitive-functionally inspired analysis of shared aspects of structure in Section 3.1.2.

3.1.1 | Deixis, structure, and mental spaces

All types of speech and thought representation involve two speech events (or “grounds,” Langacker, 1987): a current speech event from which a represented speech or thought event is accessed. We can think of the “speakers” (whether

real or fictive) in each of these as the current and represented speaker, for ease of reference; each is characterized by their own set of fundamental coordinates locating them in time, space and identity (*here—now—I*; cf. Bühler, 1934), their so-called deictic center. Direct speech and thought involves a full shift in the deictic center from the current speaker to the represented speaker, from whose perspective all pronouns, tense forms, spatiotemporal adverbials, and expressive structures are interpreted. Von Roncador (1988, pp. 55–66) uses the term *Referenzverschiebung* (reference shift) to capture this full shift of both deictic and expressive designations, allowing, for instance, the first person across reporting and reported clause to have different referents, as in *He said to me, “I’m leaving”*. In their mental space analysis, Sanders and Redeker (1996, p. 296) formulate this in terms of the subspace opening up in the reported clause being effectively “a new base space (B_2), since all aspects of the referential center are moved to the new narrator, i.e., the embedded speaker [our “represented speaker”, LV]”. Note that, as Dancygier (2021) has shown, the represented speech event or “ground” may be fictive, in the sense of leaving some aspects of the deictic center schematic or generic. In example (3) discussed in Section 2.2, for instance (“*That’s looksist, or ageist, or sexist, or blah-blah*”), while we can understand the represented addressee to be identified as the interviewee Edmund White, the represented *speaker* is in a sense generic, and the time and place can likewise not be pinned down.

The deictic shift characterizing direct speech or thought is accompanied by a kind of syntactic “reset,” in that the reported complement can feature any structure possible in a nonreported clause, including, for instance, non-declarative clauses like interrogatives and exclamatives, interjections, vocatives, discourse markers, sentence fragments, and the like (for more on the complementation structure involved, see Section 3.1.2). Examples (8) and (9), from a novel and from a radio interview, show structures such as imperative and exclamative clauses (*stop, ok?! do*), vocatives (*Sterling*) and discourse markers (*well*) which cannot normally be accommodated in the reported complement of indirect speech or thought in English. Indeed, as Mayes (1990, p. 345) already argued, because of its different structure, direct speech or thought is particularly well-suited to the expression of “affective information” which tends to get muffled in the more restrictive syntax of indirect representations.

8. “Stop looking like you’re seeing a ghost, Sterling!” Chachki purple-orange now says, throwing their hands up. “None of this was thought through properly, ok?!” (Isabel Waidner, *Sterling Karat Gold*)
9. And I was a little less interested in knowing about the cancer back then in my 20 s. I was sort of like, well, do whatever you need to do. (COCA [Corpus of Contemporary American English], Davies, 2008)

This suitability for highlighting dramatic, emotive content perhaps explains why direct speech or thought features prominently in Internet memes and other forms of social media discourse (see Box 1). Turning to the reporting clauses of direct speech or thought, these can be present (*Chachki purple-orange now says, I was sort of like*) but also, in

BOX 1 Social media forms of direct speech and thought

Different forms of social media communication are co-opting and renewing the forms and functions of direct speech and thought (see, e.g., Dancygier & Vandelanotte, 2017; Vandelanotte, 2019, 2020; Dancygier, 2021). The quotative *be like*, for instance, features in a string of Internet memes with plural noun phrase subjects (e.g., *bitches be like*) followed by an apparent quotation indicating an attitude apparently held by the group identified in the subject; the accompanying image may additionally contradict this (as in Figure 1, where the spying by means of binoculars does not confirm that “she is over him”). The use of the apparent reporting clause *said no one ever* in the bottom line of a meme similarly contradicts the quote which precedes it in the top line; in this way, the apparent direct quote is shown to actually be too ridiculous to ever be uttered by anyone at all. Dialogue forms like *me X also me Y*, with X and Y some form of depiction (like a quoted clause, or an image), serve to point up inconsistent attitudes (as in Figure 2). On Twitter, the practice of quote-tweeting someone else’s tweet provides an in-built constructional “slot” in which to express a stance (cf. Du Bois, 2007) towards the quoted tweet, verbally and/or visually (as in Figure 3, where one journalist quote-tweets another, using an animated image). These and various other, related kinds of usage require further research, but can help us better understand fundamental notions such as quotation, depiction, fictive interaction and stance.

FIGURE 1 *Be like meme*FIGURE 2 *Me X also me Y tweet*

appropriate contexts, absent, as in the second quotation in (8); they can also occur in different positions (initial or final, but also medial, “interrupting” the reported complement).

Indirect speech or thought in English is quite markedly different in the central aspects of deixis and syntax. Deictically there is no full shift to the represented speaker’s deictic center; in particular, pronouns always remain tightly controlled by the current speaker’s deictic center (compare a simple example like *he said he loved her* to *he said “I love*



FIGURE 3 Quote-tweet (Bush, 2022)

you”). Unlike in direct speech or thought, then, the subspace opened up in the reported complement is not a new base space where viewpoint gets to be located; it remains an embedded mental space accessed from the current speaker’s base space, with some aspects of viewpoint still located in that base space. This does not mean that there is no room for the represented speaker’s viewpoint at all, however, as shown in examples (10–12).

10. John₁ said that the article was written by Ann and *himself₁/him₁*. (Van Hoek, 1997, p. 176; italics LV)
11. Cross looked at Eva. Though she had stopped sobbing, Cross could see that she didn’t quite follow what was being said. Cross felt that *now* was the time to co-operate with the Party, to demonstrate class consciousness, to cast his solidarity with the revolution. (CB corpus, US Books component, qtd. in Dancygier & Vandelanotte, 2009, p. 337; italics LV)
12. So he said briskly that he would *bloody well* go inside himself and did. (Cobuild corpus, Times newspaper component, qtd. in Vandelanotte, 2009, p. 110; italics LV)

In (10), use of the so-called “logophoric reflexive” *himself* is only possible because of the availability in discourse of the viewpoint of the represented speaker, John. In the example *Speaking about John₁, Peter said that the article was written by Ann and him₁/*himself₁*, *himself* is not licensed because the represented speaker here is Peter, not John (Van Hoek, 1997, p. 176). In (11), use of the present-time deictic *now* is understood as the present moment of consciousness of the character Cross, the represented speaker, and not that of the narrator or current speaker. Indeed, this type of *was-now* combination is often discussed in relation to free indirect speech or thought (e.g., by Banfield, 1982; Adamson, 1995; Nikiforidou, 2012), but it is not exclusive to it (Vandelanotte, 2009). In (12), the highly emotive language in *bloody well* naturally reflects the represented speaker’s strength of feeling. Subjective vocabulary of this kind is often considered, in stylistic approaches in the vein of Leech and Short (1981, p. 331) and Semino & Short (2004, pp. 85–86, 180–181), as rendering the representation less (or no longer) “indirect” but more (or fully) “free,” because

these approaches start from the assumption that indirect representations cannot bear any trace of the “words and structures used in uttering the propositions concerned” (Short, 1988, p. 70). Syntactically, however, there is nothing in (12) that comes even close to the freeness of free indirect speech or thought (which, like direct speech or thought, allows nondeclarative structures, discourse markers, and the like).

These examples already suggest that the viewpoint complexity of indirect speech or thought is greater than that of direct speech or thought. Other areas that illustrate this include the area of tense use—often assumed to involve a kind of mechanical backshift of tenses (e.g., Comrie, 1986), though conceptually more intricate mechanisms have been proposed (see Davidse & Vandelanotte, 2011)—and that of referring expressions, including “value loaded expressions” (Coulmas, 1986b, p. 4), sometimes ambiguous between two readings, as in *Oedipus said that his mother was beautiful* (Banfield, 1982, p. 27) or *John asked me to dance with his hysterical wife* (Coulmas, 1986b, p. 4). The question in these last examples is whether Oedipus or John are responsible for the designations *mother* and *hysterical* (“de dicto” reading), or whether instead they are the reporting speaker’s designations (“de re” reading).

In the realm of syntactic structures, things are more clear-cut. The more tightly incorporated complement clause of indirect speech or thought in English does not allow nondeclarative clauses, so that reported questions for instance are turned into declaratives (e.g., *she asked him whether he was coming to the party*). Another option available with some verbs introducing what Halliday (1985) terms “proposals” is that of a non-finite complement (e.g., *he told them to stay away*), for which corresponding finite, declarative complements can be formulated (e.g., *he told them that they should stay away*). Other expressive constructions are limited, too: such structures as interjections, vocatives, incomplete sentences, and the like are very unusual or even impossible (Banfield, 1982). Complementizer *that* can introduce the reported complement, and reported yes/no questions require complementizer *if* or *whether*. Finally, the reporting clause is more restricted in its possibilities too: whereas in direct speech or thought its position can vary, and it can even not be expressed so long as the context is clear enough, in indirect speech or thought it is always in initial position, and necessarily present (except when adding a second complement in quick succession, as in, e.g., *He said he loved her. But that he’d leave her anyway*). These differences are important in that they explain the less lively, expressive feel which indirect speech or thought tends to have on average, compared to much direct speech or thought. Despite the important structural differences, however, it is worth reflecting on fundamental *common* aspects of the structural integration of direct and indirect speech or thought, too; to this we turn in the next section.

3.1.2 | Syntactic structure

Speech and thought representing constructions like direct and indirect speech or thought have traditionally often been assumed to involve verbal complementation, with the reported clause the direct object of the “say” or “think” verb. The existence of intransitive verbs used in reporting clauses, such as the behavioral verbs like *smile* or *frown* mentioned in Section 2.1, or the relatively recent quotative forms like *be like* and *go*, puts this type of analysis into doubt. Based on arguments from transitivity and word order phenomena, Vandelanotte (2009, 2012b) and Vandelanotte and Davidse (2009) proposed an alternative line of analysis, starting from the observation, rightly stressed by Halliday (1985) and McGregor (1997), that the fundamental syntactic relation holds between the reporting clause (as a whole, not just the verb) and the reported clause as a whole. This is confirmed by features of punctuation, prosody and gesture, as well as the positional variability and optionality of reporting clauses in the direct and “free” types. The best way of conceiving of this relationship between reporting and reported clause is in terms of Langacker’s (1987, chapter 8) model of complementation relations, in which one component structure is said to be more conceptually dependent and the other more conceptually autonomous (in other words, they exhibit “substantial asymmetry,” Langacker, 1987, p. 300). A second dimension of complementation relations concerns a different question, namely which of the component structures determines the overall type of thing designated by the composite structure (in other words, which is the “head,” understood here as the “profile determinant”; Langacker, 1987, pp. 288–289)?

Taking these two dimensions into account allows us to see the reporting clause as a conceptually dependent “head”: it is more dependent on the reported clause than vice versa, since it needs to be “completed,” whereas reported clauses can sometimes occur on their own, or be used in other constructions, for instance as subject (e.g., *“I love you” is such a simple thing to say*). At the same time, an example such as *He said “I love you”* designates a “saying” event, not a loving event (but see Box 2 for a class of exceptions), and so *he said*, while relatively more dependent, at the same time determines what the full composite structure is about. What is new about this type of analysis is that it is explicitly not a verbal complementation analysis (as is Langacker, 1997, pp. 28–29), but concerns instead an *interclausal* type of

BOX 2 Subjective uses of reporting clauses

When clauses such as *I think* or *I guess* do not construe their full literal meanings of “contemplating a thought” or “hazarding a guess,” but instead function as epistemic hedges, politeness markers, discourse markers and the like, we can speak of subjective uses of such clauses, resulting from a process of grammaticalization (e.g., Brinton, 2008; Thompson & Mulac, 1991). They then do not integrate with “reported clauses” in an interclausal type of complementation; rather, they have adverbial meanings like *perhaps*, *possibly*, and do not involve two separate speech events (current and represented). The behavior of the question tags in attested examples can be instructive: in *I think it's an old Eddie Fisher song, isn't it* (Cobuild corpus, UK spoken component, qtd. in Vandelanotte, 2009, p. 281), the tag picks up on *it* rather than *I*, confirming the analysis according to which *I think* is not the “head” of the construction. In her approach to this question, Thompson (2002) seems to over-extend the “monoclausal” analysis of such examples, as argued by for example, Vandelanotte (2006) and Boye and Harder (2007). Certainly in some examples *I think* is still a “head” and thus a reporting clause, for instance in *I think you are sad and you think you are sad so it's two against one* (quoted from the Corpus of London Teenage Language [COLT], Vandelanotte, 2006, p. 154). While true subjective uses no longer, strictly speaking, represent speech or thought, they do use a subset of the grammar of speech and thought representation to express subjective meanings.

complementation. Within this general interclausal type of complementation, of course differences remain between direct and indirect speech or thought, as indicated in the previous subsection; this can be understood as a relatively higher degree of autonomy of the direct reported complement compared to the indirect type.

Some constructions seem superficially very similar to indirect speech or thought, but in fact do not involve interclausal, but verbal complementation: these are factive constructions (e.g., Kiparsky & Kiparsky, 1970). An example such as *he accepted that he had been wrong* has a different structure compared to *he said that he had been wrong*; to cite just one indication of this, the latter but not the former allows substitution by the clausal substitute *so* (Halliday & Hasan, 1976): *he said so* but not **he accepted so*. An in-depth investigation of the factive-reported distinction from a cognitive-functional perspective is presented in Gentens (2020). Another set of constructions with a different structural analysis than one of interclausal complementation concerns subjective uses of clauses like *I think*, discussed briefly in Box 2.

3.2 | Free and distancing indirect speech or thought

As indicated in Section 1, free indirect speech or thought has been the focus of much literary and linguistic analysis. Section 3.2.1 turns to a brief discussion of its main features, while Section 3.2.2 adds a further type which has been proposed within the area “beyond” the main types of direct and indirect speech or thought, dubbed “distancing indirect speech or thought.”

3.2.1 | Free indirect speech or thought

Because of its syntactic “freeness,” shared with direct speech or thought, free indirect speech or thought can go much further than indirect speech or thought in using structures reflecting the represented speaker's expressivity, including for instance discourse markers and interjections such as *oh yes* in (13), in which Mrs Ramsay reflects on her house guest Charles Tansley; interrogatives as in (14), representing first in free indirect form, then in direct form, Mrs Dalloway's interaction with Peter Walsh; and exclamatives (as well as another interrogative) as in (15), representing Ursula's thoughts.

13. What he would have liked, she supposed, would have been to say how he had been to Ibsen with the Ramsays. He was an awful prig—*oh yes*, an insufferable bore. (Virginia Woolf, *To the Lighthouse*; italics LV)

14. She opened her scissors, and said, *did he mind her just finishing what she was doing to her dress?* “Which I shan’t ask you to,” she said. “My dear Peter!” (Virginia Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*; italics LV)
15. Tomorrow was Monday. Monday, the beginning of another school-week! Another shameful, barren school-week, mere routine and mechanical activity. *Was not the adventure of death infinitely preferable? [...] How sordid life was, how it was a terrible shame to the soul, to live now!* (D. H. Lawrence, *Women in Love*; italics LV)

Apart from illustrating the expressive potential of free indirect speech (14) or thought (13, 15), the examples also showcase the typical “blended” deictic make-up of the represented complement—a “blend” is defined in the mental spaces framework as a new combination of selected elements from different input spaces (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002). Grammatical number and tense reflect the current speaker’s deictic center, with *did he mind her just finishing* in (14) for instance corresponding to a direct version like *do you mind my just finishing*. At the same time, spatiotemporal deictics very typically reflect the represented speaker’s deictic orientation, as with the future *tomorrow* and present *now* in (15), which, as shown by Dancygier (2012, p. 191), also serve the purpose of connecting the represented utterance to the broader narrative spaces being developed in the story as a whole (e.g., *tomorrow* as the next day in the developing storyline). While this “was-now” usage, as we have seen in Section 3.1.1, is not entirely excluded in indirect speech or thought, it is the expected choice in free indirect forms (e.g., Adamson, 1995; Banfield, 1982; Nikiforidou, 2012).

This peculiar combination of full expressivity of structures and a deictic blend of perspectives appears to work especially well in narratives (not only fictional ones) to provide access to a character’s inner mental states “in an immediate, forceful and active way,” as Palmer (2004, p. 73) put it, without interrupting the flow of the narrative, as would happen in the direct form with its complete deictic shift to a character. In addition, the direct form can seem too literal-mindedly “verbal” for a lot of mental content that we often do not even fully put into words in our minds. This “double-faced” nature of free indirect speech or thought, maintaining “the accents of two differently oriented voices” (Vološinov, 1973, p. 144), has often been referred to in terms of its “dual voice” (Pascal, 1977), although, as Vološinov (1973, p. 144) already stressed, the viewpoint in this blend is ultimately located with the represented speaker (Vandelanotte, 2012a).

3.2.2 | Distancing indirect speech or thought

A further type of speech and thought representation has been proposed for English, featuring a similar blend as in free indirect speech or thought, but locating viewpoint with the current, not the represented speaker: distancing indirect speech or thought (Vandelanotte, 2004a, 2009, 2012a). In this form, the current speaker structures a thought or utterance originating in another discourse situation from their own deictic center and perspective, allowing them to express an attitude towards the “distanced” or “echoed” utterance, whether more ironic or sarcastic (e.g., *I’m a total jerk, they said*) or more supportive (Vandelanotte, 2004b).

Grammatically this type can be recognized, among other things, by the grammatical number of pronouns used in the reported complement, as with first person *we* and *I* in (16) and (17) below, corresponding to direct forms with *you* (*If you don’t like it here...; You’re very lucky*). Free indirect forms could be, for instance, *If they didn’t like it here, why didn’t they...*, or *She was very lucky*, though the first person narrative context makes this choice less typical. The effect of a first person being used to refer to what, in the represented speech event, is an addressee (*you*) is quite striking, and produces a very different effect from typical first person free indirect speech or thought as in *How my heart was beating now!* (Banfield, 1982, p. 99). Instead of being, like in the free indirect form, “immersive,” as Sweetser (2013, p. 245) puts it, there is a distancing effect, suggesting we are given the current speaker’s or narrator’s slant on the represented content. For a range of other curious pronoun uses (including an original speaker *I* being referred to as *you*), see Vandelanotte (2009, pp. 164–171).

16. For who are the Girardis if not the people, on whose behalf, for whose rights and liberties and dignities, I and my brother-in-law-to-be wind up arguing every Sunday afternoon with our hopelessly ignorant elders (who vote Democratic and think Neanderthal), my father and my uncle. *If we don’t like it here, they tell us, why don’t I go back to Russia where everything is hunky-dory?* “You’re going to turn that kid into a Communist,” my father warns Morty, whereupon I cry out, “You don’t understand! All men are brothers!” (Philip Roth, *Portnoy’s Complaint*; italics LV)

17. Joint leadership, says Merrick.

A big opportunity, says the woman.

I'm very lucky, they both agree. (Natasha Brown, *Assembly*; italics LV)

Another recurring feature of distancing indirect speech or thought is found in the possibility of using proper names or descriptive noun phrases in the reported complement to refer to the represented speaker or addressee where, from the perspective of the represented speaker (or character), these would inherently be highly accessible (i.e., cognitively activated, cf. Ariel, 1990) and therefore referred to pronominally. This is illustrated in (18), an excerpt in which a representative of the British Empire in 1933 visits a grower of sugar beet, Albert Bienenstock, in Czechoslovakia. In the represented speech event, Bienenstock would be addressed as *you* (*which you doubtless know... in your fertile native planes... Will you consider...*); a free indirect rendering would be third person, but would still use pronominal reference (*he/his*) and not *Mr Bienenstock*, to reflect the high cognitive accessibility of the represented addressee from the viewpoint of the represented speaker.

18. Sugar from cane, they were fully aware, was not a realistic possibility, owing to their weather, which Mr Bienenstock doubtless knew was capricious to a nationally celebrated fault. Sugar beet however, the staple of Mr Bienenstock's fertile native plains, seemed perfectly suited to the British climate. It was, after all, was it not, akin to the carrot, the turnip and—one must assume—the beetroot? [...] Would Mr Bienenstock consider making the journey to England, in two years' time, to counsel and instruct the ignorant farmers there, to manage test beds, to supervise refinery construction and to oversee Britain's first tentative production of the crop? (Stephen Fry, *The Hippopotamus*)

As shown in Vandelanotte (2021), the analysis can be extended historically to include emerging examples of the distancing style in the period of growth of the novel as a genre, while extensions beyond narrative fiction, from conversational to journalistic genres, have also been identified (e.g., Harry, 2014; van Krieken, 2022; van Krieken & Sanders, 2016; Vandelanotte, 2004b).

3.3 | “Constructions” between grammar and discourse

Cognitive grammar, like other construction grammar approaches (see Croft, 2005; Langacker, 2005), treats constructions as central to grammar: the constructions define what categories and roles are needed (like noun, verb, subject, and so on), rather than the other way around. Importantly, constructions are not seen as syntactic objects independent from meaning, but include semantic and pragmatic information (e.g., Fillmore et al., 1988; Goldberg, 1995). Langacker defines a construction as a “conventional symbolic unit” (1987, pp. 57–63); Croft (2005, p. 274) helpfully unpacks this as “an entrenched routine (‘unit’), that is generally used in the speech community (‘conventional’), and involves a pairing of form and meaning (‘symbolic’ [...])”. Constructions are recognized at all levels of analysis, from small (e.g., morphemes) to large (e.g., clausal constructions), and discourse-level phenomena have also been approached constructionally (e.g., Dancygier & Sweetser, 2005; Nikiforidou, 2012; Östman, 2005). Recent work is starting to expand the notion into multimodal types of constructions (see, e.g., Zima & Bergs, 2017).

In the case of the types of speech and thought representation surveyed in this section, central formal features of deixis and syntactic structure correspond to certain meanings and typical pragmatic uses (for a fuller account of these in English, see Vandelanotte, 2009). Identifying a given example in a given context may be hard, however; in particular, in fiction possible confusion between free indirect speech or thought and narration can occur (e.g., Galbraith, 1995; Pascal, 1977), and this is addressed in reader response research such as Sotirova (2006) and Bray (2007). Two points are worth highlighting in this connection. First, the presence of a full array of constructional forms is not always needed to prompt the full constructional meaning: presence of a or some particularly salient form(s) can be sufficient to metonymically call up the larger constructional frame. This was argued by Dancygier & Sweetser (2005, pp. 237–269) in their discussion of many “reduced” forms of coordinate structures with conditional meaning (e.g., *you win some, you lose some*), but it can also be applied to discourse constructions like free indirect speech or thought, for which salient forms can include, for example, viewpoint reflexives (e.g., Van Hoek, 1997; Zribi-Hertz, 1989), *was-now* forms (e.g., Adamson, 1995; Nikiforidou, 2012), or viewpoint-shifting connectives (Sotirova, 2004). Second, while context plays a role—and this might at first glance seem to invalidate the use of the “construction” label—it is worth noting that the

contextual information needed in interpreting examples is in fact not random and broad but quite specific, relating to the precise make-up of the current and represented speech events (who are the speakers and addressees in these?). In examples (19) and (20) below (from Vandelanotte, 2009, p. 7), knowledge of who the represented addressee is (or who they are) is sufficient to understand the italicized part of (19) as an example of direct speech and that of (20), in which *you* refers to the current addressee but would originally have been the absent party's proper name (for instance, *Francis will have to...*), as one of distancing indirect speech:

19. – I talked to the boss yesterday and asked him what he wanted us to do.
 - Yes?
 - *You will have to get the situation under control, he said.*
 - That's easy for him to say, it's not as if he's ever given us a clue as to how it could arise in the first place.
20. – I talked to the boss yesterday and he wasn't in a good mood.
 - That makes for a nice change.
 - *You will have to get the situation under control, he said.*
 - Why me?
 - I guess he really likes you.

With these two ideas in mind, then, we can consider the types discussed in this section as “constructions” in a broad sense.

4 | CONCLUSION

Speech and thought representing constructions allow us to structure the representations of speech, thought and related mental contents, whether real or fictive, that animate much of our communicative activity as social beings. So fundamental is the coordination of cognitive states between communicators (Verhagen, 2005) that the model of face-to-face interaction is applied across a range of constructions crosslinguistically, as research on fictive interaction is demonstrating (Pascual & Sandler, 2016). Beyond the limited case of repeating word for word some actual prior utterance in verbatim direct speech, “demonstrated” or “depicted” contents of various kinds, including performances of embodied behavior, provide different kinds and degrees of access to cognitive states and mental events in order to elicit responses, typify attitudes, provoke emotions, impress an authoritative point, and much more besides.

A particular focus of linguistic research in this domain has always been on the forms and functions of constructions “projecting” or “framing” the depicted content. In English, the main forms of direct and indirect speech or thought are distinguished by the presence vs. absence of a complete shift, in the reported complement, from the current speaker's deictic center (*I—here—now*) to that of the represented speaker. Additionally, differences in the degree of autonomy of the reported complement impose restrictions on the expressive structures licensed in the reported complement of the indirect form. Free indirect speech or thought combines a deictic blend with the syntactic freeness of the complement, locating viewpoint with the represented speaker and producing an immersive effect, whereas in the related form of distancing indirect speech or thought the current speaker draws the represented content into their deictic perspective to produce a distanced view of this “borrowed” discourse. Subjective uses of reporting clauses such as *I think* or *I guess* use a subset of the grammar of speech and thought representation, not to project represented content from a current speech event, but to overlay the main clause with subjective meanings such as epistemic nuance, politeness, and the like.

Social media forms of quotation are co-opting existing forms of speech and thought representation, but extending and changing them in the process in ways adapted to the specific platforms used. This expanding range of usage can help fine-tune existing central theoretical concepts such as demonstration or depiction, and fictive interaction. Likewise, new methods of data gathering and analysis are enabling more in-depth research into the forms and functions of speech and thought representation in multimodal language corpora of spoken and signed languages alike. Using the cognitive-linguistic concept of fictive interaction as a point of departure, the investigation of ways in which the languages of the world use apparent speech representation structures to express a broad range of grammatical meanings, proposed by Spronck and Casartelli (2021), may hold the key to unlocking large, hitherto underinvestigated areas of grammar. More generally, given its central importance to the question of viewpoint in language—and in particular the management and negotiation of multiple viewpoints in discourse, across all modalities and genres (cf. Dancygier

et al., 2016; Dancygier & Sweetser, 2012)—speech and thought representation remains a research field of abiding importance—sometimes elusive, ever exciting.

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