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Complementary Virtues and Competing Legitimacies: Inter-Chamber Relationships in a Bicameral Elected and Sortitioned Legislature

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
Complementary Virtues & Competing Legitimacies

Inter-Chamber Relationships in a Bicameral
Elected and Sortitioned Legislature

ECPR-Summer School on Democratic Innovation in Europe and the EU
Workshop-Discussion of Papers on Democratic Innovations - August 25th, 2017


Pierre-Etienne VANDAMME, Vincent JACQUET, Christoph NIESSEN, John PITSEYS & Min REUCHAMPS

Introduction




Empirical Results of Public Perception

■ In favor
■ Neutral
■ Against




Empirical Results of Public Perception

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
Empirical Results of Public Perception

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
Empirical Results of Public Perception

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Empirical Results of Public Perception


■ In favor
■ Neutral
■ Against





Elite and Citizen Opinions

- **Elite Opinions:** *(Survey sent to all Belgian MPs – n = 76/473)*
 - Sortitioned chamber: 87.5% are against
 - Mixed chamber: 65.98% are against
 - Greater confidence in election: 76,8
- **Citizen Opinions** *(Survey sent to a representative sample of Belgian citizen (n = 966))*
 - Sortitioned chamber: 38.2% are against (neutral: 32.6%)
 - Mixed chamber: 24.9% are against (neutral: 29.7%)
 - Greater confidence in election: 34.4% (neutral: 32.3%)



Four scenarios

- Equal power (absolute veto)
 - Citizen empowerment but status quo protection
- Consultative elected chamber (suspensive veto)
 - Less plausible and risks of decreasing turnout, political recruitment or shift of power to the executive
- Consultative sortitioned chamber
 - Valuable deliberative input but demotivating effects
- Mixed assembly
 - Plausible, compatible with monocameralism and less adversarial but risks of political recruitment and intellectual domination

Open question

- What to do with the description of the population ?
- Feasibility ? How to convince the population

Thx

Contents



2 – Complementary Virtues

- Arguments by Gastil and Wright (2017)
- Additional Considerations



1 – Experiences from Belgium

- Political Propositions
- Elite and Citizen Opinions




3 – Competing Legitimacies

- Electoral Legitimacy
- Sortition Legitimacy

4 – Inter-Chamber Relations

- Equal Power
- Consultative Elected Chamber
- Consultative Sortitioned Chamber
- A Mixed Assembly?





Experiences from Belgium

- Political Propositions
- Elite and Citizen Opinions



Political Propositions

- **Origins**
 - Citizen panels and deliberative Mini-publics
 - Window of opportunity: sixth state reform => weakening of the Senate
 - **Concrete propositions:**
 - Vanvelthoven (sp.a):
 - 10,000 → 150
 - One-year term, 2-3 meetings/week
 - Two projects/senator + two projects from the Chamber
- Picked up by Vandeburre (Ecolo), Onkelinx (PS), Antoine (cdH)
- * Proposition of mixed parliamentary commissions: Ecolo



Elite and Citizen Opinions

- **Elite Opinions:** *(Survey sent to all Belgian MPs – n = 76/473)*
 - Sortitioned chamber: 87.5% are against
 - Mixed chamber: 65.98% are against
 - Greater confidence in election: 76,85%
 - * Women and greens appear to be less critical (but still are)
- **Citizen Opinions** *(Survey sent to a representative sample of Belgian citizen (n = 966))*
 - Sortitioned chamber: 38.2% are against (neutral: 32.6%)
 - Mixed chamber: 24.9% are against (neutral: 29.7%)
 - Greater confidence in election: 34.4% (neutral: 32.3%)
 - * 45.4% support for mixed chamber

Qualitative Research Results
of Jacquet (2017)...



Complementary Virtues

- Arguments by Gastil & Wright (2017)
- Additional Considerations



Additional Considerations

- Why elections matter – Three more reasons:
- Participation: equal probability different from equal possibility
- Consent: “to be represented, and to be represented by such or such candidate”
- Accountability: “sortition cannot offer it by itself” + limited accountability role of abstention with sortition




Conflicting Legitimacies

- Electoral Legitimacy
- Sortitioned Legitimacy




Electoral and sortitioned legitimacies

- Electoral: equal possibility + legitimacy vs. justice
 - 1) Elections = chance to choose better representatives vs. Sortition = hope
 - 2) Elections = opportunity to choose representatives but limited accountability (lack of information and absence of recall)
- Sortitioned: not the “active” choice but:
 - 1) Independence (and thus more representative) of sortitioned representatives
 - 2) Similarity
 - 3) Humility




Inter-Chamber Relations

- → Distribution of power: weak vs. strong bicameralism
- Equal Power
- Consultative Elected Chamber
- Consultative Sortitioned Chamber
- A Mixed Assembly?



Four “models”

- Equal power
 - But status quo and autonomous epistemic communities
- Consultative elected chamber (presidential system?)
 - But political recruitment, loss of electoral legitimacy, stronger executive
- Consultative sortitioned chamber
 - But demotivating effects and public frustration
- Mixed assembly
 - But political recruitment and intellectual domination



Conclusion

- Different → competing → conflicting legitimacies?
- Distribution of power: different models
- Trade-off(s)