

RESEARCH OUTPUTS / RÉSULTATS DE RECHERCHE

IntraPartyComp: The study of personalization in 33 democracies since the 2000s

Dodeigne, Jérémy; Pilet, Jean-Benoit; Put, Gert-Jan

Publication date:
2021

Document Version
Autre version

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (HARVARD):

Dodeigne, J, Pilet, J-B & Put, G-J 2021, 'IntraPartyComp: The study of personalization in 33 democracies since the 2000s'.

General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.



INTRAPARTYCOMP

THE STUDY OF PERSONALIZATION IN 33 DEMOCRACIES
SINCE THE 2000s

JÉRÉMY DODEIGNE, GERT-JAN PUT & JEAN-BENOIT PILET

PRESENTATION OUTLINE

1. General presentation of the project
2. Current status of data collection and ambition
3. Exploratory empirical results
4. Next steps: strategic priorities?

GENERAL PRESENTATION OF THE PROJECT



THE FOCUS OF INTRAPARTYCOMP

- A **comprehensive study** of electoral personalization and intraparty competition in global set of **list PR systems (N=33)**
- The degree of centralized versus decentralized personalization
- The role of **institutional** (i.e. electoral institutions, political system architecture, age of democracy), **party-level** (i.e. leadership, government status, candidate selection dynamics) and **time** as potential **determinants**
- **Consequences** of intraparty competition for party strategies, government stability, voter perceptions and behavior

THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY OF INTRAPARTYCOMP

- A **global** data collection project
- Analyzing the **distribution of preference votes** over candidates on party lists using established indicators
- **Systematic data collection** since 2000: preference votes, list positions, parties, gender, age, incumbency status, district magnitude and party magnitude
- **Open publication** of dataset on project website as resource for political science scholars

EMPIRICAL SCOPE OF INTRAPARTYCOMP

Country	World region	List PR type	N elections since 2000 (first-last)	Status
Austria	Europe	Flexible	6 (2002-2019)	✓
Belgium	Europe	Flexible	5 (2003-2019)	✓
Netherlands	Europe	Flexible	6 (2002-2017)	✓
Bulgaria	Europe	Flexible (since 2013)	3 (2013-2017)	
Croatia	Europe	Flexible (since 2015)	3 (2015-2020)	✓
Czech Republic	Europe	Flexible	5 (2002-2017)	✓
Denmark	Europe	Open	6 (2001-2019)	
Estonia	Europe	Flexible	5 (2003-2019)	✓
Finland	Europe	Open	5 (2003-2019)	✓
Greece	Europe	Open	7 (2004-2019)	✓
Iceland	Europe	Flexible	6 (2003-2017)	
Kosovo	Europe	Open	4 (2010-2019)	
Latvia	Europe	Open	6 (2002-2018)	✓
Lithuania	Europe	Mixed Member (open list component)	5 (2000-2016)	✓
Poland	Europe	Open	6 (2001-2019)	✓
Slovakia	Europe	Flexible	6 (2002-2020)	✓


Country	World region	List PR type	N elections since 2000 (first-last)	Status
Sweden	Europe	Flexible	5 (2002-2018)	✓
Chile	South America	Open	1 (2017)	✓
Colombia	South America	Variable open/closed (since 2003)	4 (2006-2018)	✓
Ecuador	South America	Open	5 (2002-2017)	
Indonesia	Asia	Open (since 2009)	3 (2009-2019)	
Peru	South America	Open	5 (2001-2020)	✓
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Europe	Open	5 (2002-2018)	✓
Cyprus	Europe	Open	4 (2001-2016)	
Brazil	South America	Open	5 (2002-2018)	✓
Lebanon	Asia	Open (since 2017)	1 (2018)	
Sri Lanka	Asia	Open	5 (2000-2015)	
Suriname	South America	Flexible	5 (2000-2020)	
Panama	North America	Mixed Member (open list component)	4 (2004-2019)	
Luxembourg	Europe	Free	4 (2004-2018)	✓
Switzerland	Europe	Free	5 (2003-2019)	
El Salvador	North America	Free	7 (2000-2018)	✓
Honduras	North America	Free	5 (2001-2017)	

EMPIRICAL SCOPE OF INTRAPARTYCOMP

Countries	Nb. elections	Nb. candidates	Countries	Nb. elections	Nb. candidates
Austria	6	37 090	Finland	9	15 038
Belgium	5	9 627	Greece	2	9 523
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5	3 139	Latvia	6	8 860
Brazil	5	32 302	Lithuania	5	6 356
Chile	1	960	Luxembourg	4	2 341
Colombia	2	2 714	Netherlands	7	8 072
Croatia	3	7 401	Peru	3	6 200
Czech Republic	7	37 621	Poland	6	44 358
El Salvador	4	2 416	Slovakia	6	6 122
Estonia	5	5 529	Sweden	2	15 402

FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: TWO INDICATORS

Relative (0-100 percent)



$$\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta}$$


- (1) Scale independence
- (2) Population independence
- (3) Transfer principle

Absolute (0 to n candidates)


$$\text{Effective Number of Candidates (ENC)} = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2}$$

- (1) Intuitive and direct
- (2) Consistent with 'descriptive' reality
- (3) Sensitive to mechanical effects



FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: GINI




FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: ENC



FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: GINI




FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: GINI



Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 1-4


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		-.31*** (.11)	-.25** (.11)	-.13 (.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed		-.03 (.11)	.02 (.11)	-.06 (.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		-.19*** (.07)	-.14** (.07)	-.005 (.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14*** (.003)	.01 (.01)	.09*** (.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12*** (.01)	-.04*** (.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27*** (.003)
Constant	.46*** (.04)	.50*** (.05)	.43*** (.05)	-.14*** (.04)
Observations	15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126
Log Likelihood	4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.30
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.68
Note:	.p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.1; ***p<0.001			



Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 1-4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		-.31*** (.11)	-.25** (.11)	-.13 (.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed		-.03 (.11)	.02 (.11)	-.06 (.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		-.19*** (.07)	-.14** (.07)	-.005 (.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14*** (.003)	.01 (.01)	.09*** (.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12*** (.01)	-.04*** (.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27*** (.003)
Constant	.46*** (.04)	.50*** (.05)	.43*** (.05)	-.14*** (.04)
Observations	15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126
Log Likelihood	4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.30
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.68
Note:	p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.1; ***p<0.001			


Model 4 - Effects of the type of electoral systems on the list's gini scores



Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 1-4


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		-.31*** (.11)	-.25** (.11)	-.13 (.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed		-.03 (.11)	.02 (.11)	-.06 (.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		-.19*** (.07)	-.14** (.07)	-.005 (.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14*** (.003)	.01 (.01)	.09*** (.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12*** (.01)	-.04*** (.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27*** (.003)
Constant	.46*** (.04)	.50*** (.05)	.43*** (.05)	-.14*** (.04)
Observations	15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126
Log Likelihood	4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.30
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.68

Note: .p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.1; ***p<0.001

Model 3 - Effects of the type of electoral systems on the list's gini scores


Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 1-4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		-.31*** (.11)	-.25** (.11)	-.13 (.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed		-.03 (.11)	.02 (.11)	-.06 (.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		-.19*** (.07)	-.14** (.07)	-.005 (.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14*** (.003)	.01 (.01)	.09*** (.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12*** (.01)	-.04*** (.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27*** (.003)
Constant	.46*** (.04)	.50*** (.05)	.43*** (.05)	-.14*** (.04)
Observations	15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126
Log Likelihood	4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.30
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.68
Note:	.p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.1; ***p<0.001			

Model 2 - Effects of party magnitude on the list's gini scores

Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 1-4


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		-.31*** (.11)	-.25** (.11)	-.13 (.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed		-.03 (.11)	.02 (.11)	-.06 (.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		-.19*** (.07)	-.14** (.07)	-.005 (.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14*** (.003)	.01 (.01)	.09*** (.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12*** (.01)	-.04*** (.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27*** (.003)
Constant	.46*** (.04)	.50*** (.05)	.43*** (.05)	-.14*** (.04)
Observations	15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126
Log Likelihood	4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.30
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.68
Note:	p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.1; ***p<0.001			

Model 4 - Effects of nb. of candidates on the list's gini scores

Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 5-7

	(1)	(2)	(3)
ElectoralSystemsFree	-.13 (.09)	.13 (.08)	-.11 (.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen	.02 (.06)	-.23*** (.06)	.01 (.06)
ParliamentaryParty1	.08*** (.01)	.06*** (.01)	.07*** (.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3	-.04*** (.005)	-.02*** (.005)	-.04*** (.01)
NumberCandidates_0.3	.25*** (.003)	.19*** (.005)	.25*** (.003)
Incumbent_0.3	.01*** (.003)	.01*** (.003)	.01*** (.003)
ElectoralSystemsFree:NumberCandidates_0.3		-.17*** (.02)	
ElectoralSystemsOpen:NumberCandidates_0.3		.10*** (.01)	
ElectoralSystemsFree:PartyMagnitude_0.3			-.06*** (.01)
ElectoralSystemsOpen:PartyMagnitude_0.3			.01*** (.01)
Constant	-.11*** (.04)	.07* (.04)	-.10** (.04)
Observations	13,117	13,117	13,117
Log Likelihood	7,995.02	8,266.40	8,025.33
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-15,972.05	-16,510.79	-16,028.67
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-15,904.71	-16,428.49	-15,946.37
Note:	.p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Model 6 - Effects of the type of electoral systems on the list's gini scores



NEXT STEPS: STRATEGIC PRIORITIES?

- Deepening: Focus on integrating additional candidate-level (e.g. prior candidate experience and list positions, political career pattern), list-level (e.g. prior results and party strongholds), district-level (electoral fragmentation, urban-rural characteristics) variables for a fixed set of countries ($N = \sim 25$)
- Widening: Focus on expanding the set of included country cases to $N = \sim 35$
- Journal publication to highlight first findings, scope of database, patterns by country and temporal comparisons
- Future efforts to include upcoming elections in list PR systems

NEXT STEPS (II): HOW TO INCORPORATE THE EFFECT OF LIST SYSTEMS?

- A crucial hypothesis: the electoral system, and especially the nature of the list system, would affect the nature of intraparty competition
 - Number of preferential that could be cast
 - Openness of the list (closed/flexible/open)
- But how to differentiate among flexible list systems (Shugart et al., 2005)?
 - 11 countries with flexible list systems in our project (especially in Europe)
- Two main approaches
 - Based upon past electoral results: what share of MPs were elected in past elections only based on their personal score (André, Depauw, Shugart & Chytilík, 2017)
 - Based upon the formal rules, and how hard it is to be elected irrespective of list position (Renwick and Pilet, 2016)

APPROACH 1: PAST ELECTION RESULTS

- Two main indicators
 - Share of MPs elected on basis of preference/personal votes only
 - Share of MPs elected disturbing list order
- Some examples from our dataset
 - Belgium: 5% of MPs elected only on their preference votes; Slovakia: 0%, Croatia: 49%; Sweden: 60%; CZ: 69%
- Difficulties
 - It might reflect how good are parties at playing with the rules of the game (and how bad coordination is among voters to disturb list order).
 - Should it be captured at country-level or at list-in-district level?

APPROACH 2: FORMAL RULES

- Main advantage: independent of parties' and voters' behaviors
- Rather easy for the 'threshold system' (candidates directly elected if reaching a % of all votes for the list)
 - A specific percentage: 5% in CZ, 8% in Sweden, 9% in BG, 10% in Croatia, 50% in Slovakia
 - The Hare quota (or a share of it): Austria, NL, Suriname
- But more complex for other system
 - List votes transfer (Belgium)
 - Almost fully closed system like Estonia where list order prevails except in very rare cases
 - Almost fully open system like Iceland where personal votes prevails but non pre-printed ballot protect list order
- Other difficulties
 - How to cope with system combining several mechanisms (How to classify fully open (0% threshold) and fully closed systems (100% threshold)?)
 - Should it be captured at country-level or at list-in-district level?